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FOREWORD TO GUIDE
This document, AICPA/CICA WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities Version 1.0, was
developed with initial and on-going input from a variety of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
practitioners including both providers and users of PKI. Through the exposure draft process, the
AICPA/CICA Electronic Commerce Assurance Task Force received a number of meaningful
comments from a variety of international organizations including Certification Authority service
providers, users, public accounting firms, national accounting societies, and government entities.
Since the Exposure Draft was published in February 2000, the Task Force members have
considered each of the comments received. The comments received ranged from general to
detailed and are regarded as valuable input. The majority of the comments received resulted in
some change to the document, although some did not as they were, in some cases, deemed to be
beyond the intended scope of the current document. The Task Force expects the WebTrust
Program for Certification Authorities to evolve as public key infrastructure technology evolves
and looks forward to working with interested parties in the evolution of the WebTrust Program
for Certification Authorities.
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PREFACE
USE OF THE TERM CA IN THIS DOCUMENT
This document describes the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities
which has been developed as part of the WebTrust family of services.
Within the electronic commerce (e-commerce) industry, companies whose main business is to
act as certification authorities, or companies who have established a certification authority
function to support an e-commerce business activity, are routinely referred to as CAs or as
performing a CA function.
In Canada (and certain other jurisdictions), public accounting professionals, including the
practitioner’s who are licensed to perform WebTrust assurance services, carry the title of
Chartered Accountants, also routinely referred to as CAs or as being a CA.
In order to avoid confusion in this document, the term Practitioner, which is used widely in
accounting literature, is used to identify a Chartered Accountant or Certified Public Accountant
(CPA), or the equivalent, who is licensed to perform WebTrust assurance services.

The term CA is never used beyond this preface to refer to a Chartered Accountant.

The term CA is only used to denote a Certification Authority (CA) or to refer to the
Certification Authority function (CA function).

The term practitioner is used to denote a properly qualified and licensed Certified Public
Accountant (U.S.) or Chartered Accountant (Cdn.).

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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INTRODUCTION
This document provides a framework for licensed WebTrust practitioners to assess the adequacy and
effectiveness of the controls employed by Certification Authorities (CAs), the importance of which will
continue to increase as the need for third-party authentication increases to provide assurance with respect
to e-commerce business activities. As a result of the technical nature of the activities involved in securing
of e-commerce transactions, this document also provides a brief overview of public key infrastructure
(PKI) using cryptography, trusted third-party concepts, and their increasing use in e-commerce.
Confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation are the four most important ingredients
required for trust in e-commerce transactions. The emerging response to these requirements is the
implementation of PKI technology. PKI utilizes digital certificates and asymmetric cryptography to
address these requirements.
PKI provides a means for relying parties (meaning, recipients of certificates who act in reliance on those
certificates and/or digital signatures verified using those certificates) to know that another individual's or
entity’s public key actually belongs to that individual/entity. CA organizations and/or CA functions have
been established to address this need. PKI uses public/private-key pairs—two mathematically related
keys. One of these keys is typically made public, by posting it in a publicly accessible read-only
repository for example, while the other remains private. Public-key cryptography works in such a way
that a message encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted with the private key, and conversely a
message signed with a private key can be verified with the public key. This technology can be used in
different ways to provide confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation.
Cryptography is critical to establishing secure e-commerce. However, it has to be coupled with other
secure protocols in order to provide a comprehensive security solution. Several cryptographic protocols
require digital certificates (in effect, electronic credentials) issued by an independent trusted third party
(the CA) to authenticate the transaction. CAs have assumed an increasingly important role in secure ecommerce. Although there is a large body of existing national, international, and proprietary standards
and guidelines for the use of cryptography, the management of digital certificates, and the policies and
practices of CAs, these standards have not been applied or implemented uniformly.
To increase consumer confidence in the Internet as a vehicle for conducting e-commerce and to increase
consumer confidence in the application of PKI technology, the public accounting profession has
developed and is promoting a set of principles and criteria for CAs, referred to as the WebTrust Principles
and Criteria for Certification Authorities. Public accounting firms and practitioners, who are specifically
WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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licensed by the AICPA/CICA can provide assurance services to evaluate and test whether the services
provided by a particular Certification Authority meet these principles and criteria. The posting of the
WebTrust seal of assurance for Certification Authorities is a symbolic representation of a practitioner’s
unqualified report. Similar to the WebTrust seal for business-to-consumer e-commerce, it also indicates
that those who use the digital certificates (and certificate status information) issued by the Certification
Authority, subscribers and relying parties, can click on the seal to see the practitioner’s report. This seal
would be displayed on the CA’s Web site together with links to the practitioner’s report and other
relevant information.
This is an initial version of the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities. It is
intended to address user (meaning, subscriber and relying party) needs and concerns and is designed to
benefit users and providers of CA e-commerce assurance services by providing a common body of
knowledge that is communicated to such parties.

We anticipate that future revisions will be needed to

update these criteria and related materials as the available technology and common business practices
evolve. Your input is not only welcome, it is essential to help ensure that these principles and their
supporting criteria are kept up-to-date and remain responsive to marketplace needs.
The AICPA/CICA WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities are consistent with
standards being developed by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF). 1

1 The ANSI X9F5 Digital Signature and Certificate Policy working group is developing the X9.79 PKI Practices
and Policy Framework (X9.79) standard for the financial services community. This standard includes detailed
Certification Authority Control Objectives against which Certification Authorities may be evaluated.

An

International Organization for Standardization (ISO) working group has been formed to standardize X9.79 based on
international requirements in a new international standard. In addition, the American Bar Association’s Information
Security Committee (ABA-ISC) is developing the PKI Assessment Guidelines (PAG) which address the legal and
technical requirements for Certification Authorities. The PAG makes reference to the Certification Authority
Control Objectives that are detailed in the draft X9.79 standard and reflected in the WebTrust Principles and
Criteria for Certification Authorities. The Certification Authority Control Objectives referred to in each of these
documents were developed based on the existing body of ANSI, ISO, IETF, and other existing standards.
WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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OVERVIEW
What is Electronic Commerce (e-commerce)?
E-commerce involves individuals and organizations engaging in a variety of electronic business
transactions, without paper documents, using computer and telecommunication networks.

These

networks can be either private or public, or a combination of the two. Traditionally, the definition of ecommerce has been focused on Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) as the primary means of conducting
business electronically between entities having a pre-established contractual relationship. Commerce has
also been conducted electronically for years in the form of credit card transactions authorized at the point
of sale, debit card transactions, and cash advances from automatic teller machines. More recently,
however, with the development of electronic mail, and separately, the browser and HTML, the definition
of e-commerce has broadened to encompass business conducted over the Internet between entities
generally not previously known to each other. This is attributable to the Web’s surge in popularity and
the acceptance of the Internet as a viable transport mechanism for business information. The use of a
public network-based infrastructure such as the Internet can reduce costs and “level the playing field” for
small and large businesses. This allows companies of all sizes to extend their reach to a broader customer
base.
What is a Public Key Infrastructure?
With the expansion of e-commerce, PKI is growing in importance and will probably be the most critical
enterprise security investment a company will make in the next several years. PKI enables parties to an ecommerce transaction to identify one another by providing authentication with digital certificates, and
allows reliable business communications by providing confidentiality through the use of encryption, and
authentication, data integrity, and a reasonable basis for nonrepudiation through the use of digital
signatures.
PKI uses public/private-key pairs–two mathematically related keys. Typically, one of these keys is made
public, by posting it on the Internet for example, while the other remains private.

Public-key

cryptography works in such a way that a message encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted
with the private key, and, conversely, a message signed with a private key can be verified with the public
key. This technology can be used in different ways to provide the four ingredients required for trust in ecommerce transactions, namely: confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation.

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

© 2000 AICPA / CICA
Page 10

Version 1.0

Using PKI, a subscriber (meaning, an end entity (or individual) whose public key is cryptographically
bound to his or her identity in a digital certificate) has an asymmetric cryptographic key pair (meaning, a
public key and a private key). The subscriber's private key must be kept secret, whereas the public key
may be made widely available, usually presented in the form of a digital certificate to ensure that relying
parties know with confidence the identity to which the public key belongs.

Using public key

cryptography, the subscriber could send a message signed with his or her private key. The signature can
be validated by the message recipient using the subscriber's public key. The subscriber could also encrypt
a message using the recipient's public key. The message can be decrypted only with the recipient's
private key.
A subscriber first obtains a public/private key pair (generated by the subscriber or for the subscriber as a
service). The subscriber then goes through a registration process by submitting their public key to a
Certification Authority or a Registration Authority (RA), which acts as an agent for the CA. The CA or
RA verifies the identity of the subscriber in accordance with the CA’s established business practices (that
may be contained in a Certification Practice Statement), and then issues a digital certificate.

The

certificate includes the subscriber's public key and identity information, and is digitally signed by the CA,
which binds the subscriber's identity to that public key. The CA also manages the subscriber's digital
certificate through the certificate life cycle (meaning, from registration through revocation or expiration).
In some circumstances, it remains important to manage digital certificates even after expiry or revocation
so that digital signatures on stored documents held past the revocation or expiry period can be validated at
a later date.
The following diagram illustrates the relationship between a subscriber’s public and private keys, and
how they are used to secure messages sent to a relying party.

Private
key

Public
key
Unique
mathematical
relationship

Can only be
opened with
private key
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A transaction submitted by a customer to an online merchant via the Internet can be encrypted with the
merchant’s public key and therefore can only be decrypted by that merchant using the merchant’s private
key—ensuring a level of confidentiality. Confidentiality can also be achieved through the use of Secure
Socket Layer (SSL), Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), and other protocols, such
as Secure Electronic Transaction (SET).
What is a Digital Signature?
Digital signatures can be used to provide authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation.

Generally

speaking, if a customer sends a digitally signed message to a merchant, the customer’s private key is used
to generate the digital signature and the customer’s public key can be used by the merchant to verify the
signature. The mathematical processes employed are somewhat different depending on the kind of
asymmetric cryptographic algorithm employed. For example, the processes are slightly different for
reversible algorithms (i.e., those which can be readily used to support digital signatures as well as
encryption) such as Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) and irreversible algorithms such the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA).
The following example illustrates the digital signature generation and verification process for a reversible
asymmetric cryptographic algorithm (such as RSA). Suppose a customer wants to send a digitally signed
message to a merchant.

The customer runs the message through a hash function (meaning, a

mathematical function that converts a message into a fixed length block of data, the hash, in a fashion
such that the hash uniquely reflects the message – in effect, it is the message’s “fingerprint”). The
customer then transforms the hash using the algorithm and the customer’s private key to create the digital
signature which is appended to the message. A header is also appended to the message, indicating the
merchant’s email address, the sender’s email address, and other information such as the time the message
is sent. The message header, the message itself, and the digital signature are then sent to the merchant.
The customer can optionally send his/her public key certificate to the merchant in the message itself. All
of this is usually done by the e-mail software in such a way that the process is transparent to the user.
The following diagram illustrates the process of using a subscriber’s key pair to ensure the integrity and
authenticity of a message sent by the customer (subscriber) to a merchant.

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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To determine whether the message came from the customer (meaning, authentication) and to determine
whether the message has not been modified (meaning, integrity), the merchant validates the digital
signature. To do so, the merchant must obtain the customer’s public key certificate. If the customer did
not send his or her public key certificate as part of the message, the merchant would typically obtain the
customer’s public key certificate from an online repository (maintained by the CA or another party acting
as the agent of the CA, or any other source even if unrelated to the CA). The merchant then validates that
the customer’s digital certificate (containing the customer’s public key) was signed by a recognized
Certification Authority to ensure that the binding between the public key and the customer represented in
the certificate has not been altered. Next, the merchant extracts the public key from the certificate and
uses that public key to transform the digital signature to reveal the original hash. The merchant then runs
the message as received through the same hash function to create a hash of the received message. To
verify the digital signature, the merchant compares these two hashes. If they match, then the digital
signature validates and the merchant knows that the message came from the customer and it was not
modified from the time the signature was made. If the hashes do not match, then the merchant knows that
the message was either modified in transit or the message was not signed with the customer’s private key.
As a result, the merchant cannot rely on the digital signature.
Digital signatures can also be used to provide a basis for nonrepudiation (meaning that the signer cannot
readily deny having signed the message). For example, an online brokerage customer who purchases one
thousand shares of stock using a digitally signed order via the Internet should have a difficult task if he or
she later tries to deny (meaning, repudiate) having authorized the purchase.
What are the Differences Between Encryption Key Pairs and Signing Key Pairs?
As stated earlier, establishing a reasonable basis for nonrepudiation requires that the private key used to
create a digital signature (meaning, the signing private key) be generated and stored securely under the
sole control of the user. In the event a user forgets his or her password or loses, breaks, or destroys
his/her signing private key, it is acceptable to generate a new signing key pair for use from that point

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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forward with minimal impact to the subscriber. Previously signed documents can still be verified with the
user’s old signature verification public key. Documents subsequently signed with the user’s new signing
private key must be verified with the user’s new signature verification public key.
Extra care is required to secure the Certification Authority’s signing private key, which is used for
signing user certificates. The trustworthiness of all certificates issued by a CA depends upon the CA’s
protecting its private signing key. CAs often securely back up their private signing key(s) for business
continuity purposes to allow the CA to continue to operate in the event that the CA’s private signing key
is accidentally destroyed (but not compromised) as a result of hardware failure, for example. Except for
CA business continuity purposes, there are generally no technical or business reasons to back up a signing
private key.
On the other hand, and as cited earlier, it is often desirable that a key pair used for encryption and
decryption be securely backed up to ensure that encrypted data can be recovered when a user forgets his
or her password or otherwise loses access to his or her decryption key. This is analogous to requiring that
the combination to a safe be backed up in case the user forgets it, or becomes incapacitated. As a result, a
PKI typically requires two key pairs for each user: one key pair for encryption and decryption and a
second key pair for signing and signature verification.
What is a Certification Authority?
In order for these technologies to enable parties to securely conduct e-commerce, one important question
must be answered. How will we know in the digital world that an individual’s public key actually
belongs to that individual? A digital certificate, which is an electronic document containing information
about an individual and his or her public key, is the answer. This document is digitally signed by a
trusted organization referred to as a Certification Authority (CA). The basic premise is that the CA is
vouching for the link between an individual’s identity and his or her public key. The Certification
Authority provides a level of assurance that the public key contained in the certificate does indeed belong
to the entity named in the certificate. The digital signature placed on the public key certificate by the CA
provides the cryptographic binding between the entity’s public key, the entity’s name, and other
information in the certificate, such as a validity period. For a relying party to determine whether the
certificate was issued by a legitimate CA, the relying party must verify the issuing CA’s signature on the
certificate. The public keys of many common Root CAs (as later defined) are pre-loaded into standard
Web browser software (for example, Netscape Navigator or Microsoft Internet Explorer). This allows the
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relying party to verify the issuing CA’s signature using the CA’s public key to determine whether the
certificate was issued by a trusted CA.
The purpose of a CA is to manage the certificate life cycle, which includes generation and issuance,
distribution, renewal and rekey, revocation, and suspension of certificates. The CA frequently delegates
the initial registration of subscribers to Registration Authorities (RAs) which act as agents for the CA. In
some cases, the CA may perform registration functions directly. The CA is also responsible for providing
certificate status information though the issuance of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) and/or the
maintenance of an online status checking mechanism. Typically, the CA posts the certificates and CRLs
that it has issued to a repository (such as an online directory) which is accessible to relying parties.
What is a Registration Authority?
A Registration Authority (RA) is an entity that is responsible for the identification and authentication of
subscribers, but does not sign or issue certificates. In some cases, the CA performs the subscriber
registration function internally. In other cases, the CA might delegate the RA function to external
registration authorities (sometimes referred to as Local Registration Authorities or LRAs) that may or
may not be part of the same legal entity as the CA. In still other cases, a customer of a CA (for example,
a company) may arrange with that CA to perform the RA function itself or using its agent.

These

external registration authorities are required to comply with the relevant provisions of the CA’s business
practices disclosures, often documented in a Certification Practice Statement and applicable Certificate
Policy(s). In performing a WebTrust for Certification Authorities engagement, the practitioner must
consider how the CA handles the RA function and whether the RA function is within the scope of the
examination.

For example, a CA that provides CA services to several banks, might delegate the

subscriber registration function to RAs that are specifically designated functional groups within each
bank. The functions performed by these specific groups would typically be outside the scope of the
WebTrust for Certification Authorities examination performed for the CA. In this case management's
assertion should specify those aspects of the registration process that are not handled by the CA.
The initial registration process for a subscriber is as follows, though the steps may vary from CA to CA
and will also depend upon the Certificate Policy under which the certificate is to be issued. The
subscriber first generates his or her own public/private key pair. (In some implementations, a CA may
generate the subscriber’s key pair and securely deliver it to the subscriber, but this is normally done only
for encryption key pairs, not signature key pairs.) Then the subscriber produces proof of identity in
accordance with the applicable Certificate Policy requirements and demonstrates that he or she holds the

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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private key corresponding to the public key without disclosing the private key (typically by digitally
signing a piece of data with the private key, with the subscriber’s digital signature then verified by the
CA). Once the association between a person and a public key is verified, the CA issues a certificate. The
CA digitally signs each certificate that it issues with its private key to provide the means for establishing
authenticity and integrity of the certificate.
The CA then notifies the subscriber of certificate issuance and gives the subscriber an opportunity to
review the contents of the certificate before it is made public. Assuming the subscriber approves the
accuracy of the certificate, the subscriber will publish the certificate and/or have the CA publish it and
make it available to other users. A repository is an electronic certificate database that is available on-line.
The repository may be maintained by the CA or a third party contracted for that purpose, or by the
subscriber, or by any other party. Subscribers may obtain certificates of other subscribers and certificate
status information from the repository. For example, if a subscriber’s certificate was revoked, the
repository would indicate that the subscriber’s certificate has been revoked and should not be relied upon.
The ability to update the repository is typically retained by the CA. Subscribers and other relying parties
would have read only access to the repository. Because the certificates stored in the repository are
digitally signed by the CA, they cannot be maliciously changed without detection, even if someone were
to hack into the repository.
The following diagram illustrates the relationship between the subscriber and the RA and CA functions.
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What are a Certification Practice Statement and a Certificate Policy?
A Certification Practice Statement (CPS) is a statement of the practices which a Certification Authority
employs in issuing and managing certificates. A Certificate Policy (CP) is a named set of rules that
indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with
common security requirements.

For example, a particular Certificate Policy might indicate the

applicability of a type of certificate to the authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for the
trading of goods within a given price range.
What is the Difference Between Licensed and Nonlicensed CAs?
Many countries, states, and other governmental jurisdictions have enacted or are developing digital
signature laws. In those jurisdictions that have digital signature laws and provide for CA licensing,
certificates issued by licensed Certification Authorities typically have a higher level of legal recognition
than those issued by nonlicensed CAs. For a number of jurisdictions, the use of certificates issued by
licensed CAs are provided specific recognition in those jurisdictions’ digital signature laws. In the United
States, for example, several state digital signature laws require that audits of Certification Authorities be
performed as a requirement for licensing. One of the purposes of this document is to provide standards
that would meet the requirements of various governmental jurisdictions and the marketplace.
What Are the Hierarchical and Cross-Certified CA Models?
CAs may be linked using two basic architectures or a hybrid of the two: (1) hierarchical and (2) crosscertified (shared trust).

In a hierarchical model, a highest level (or “Root”) CA is deployed and

subordinate CAs may be set up for various business units, domains or communities of interest. The Root
CA validates the subordinate CAs, which in turn issue certificates to lower tier CAs or directly to
subscribers. Such a Root CA typically has more stringent security requirements than a subordinate CA.
Although it is difficult for an attacker to access the Root CA (which in some implementations is only online in the rare event that it must issue, renew, or revoke subordinate CA certificates), one drawback to
this model is that the Root CA represents a single point of failure. In the hierarchical model, the Root CA
maintains the established “community of trust” by ensuring that each entity in the hierarchy conforms to a
minimum set of practices. Adherence to the established policies may be tested through audits of the
subordinate CAs and, in a number of cases, the Registration Authorities.
The following diagram illustrates the structure and relationships between certification authorities and
subscribers operating in a hierarchical model.
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Certificate

In an alternative model, cross-certified CAs are built on a “peer-to-peer” model. Rather than deploying a
common Root CA, the cross-certification model shares trust among CAs known to one another. Crosscertification is a process in which two CAs certify the trustworthiness of the other’s certificates. If two
CAs, CA1 and CA2, cross-certify, CA1 creates and digitally signs a certificate containing the public key
of CA2 (and vice versa). Consequently, users in either CA domain are assured that each CA trusts the
other and therefore subscribers in each domain can trust each other. Cross-certified CAs are not subject
to the single point of failure in the hierarchical model. However, the network is only as strong as the
weakest CA, and requires continual policing.

In the cross-certified model, to establish and maintain a

community of trust, audits may be performed to ensure that each cross-certified CA conforms to a
minimum set of practices as agreed upon by the members of the community of trust.
The following diagram illustrates the structure and relationships between certification authorities and
subscribers operating in a cross-certified (shared trust) model.
CA-1, CA-2, CA-3 Cross certify each other

CA-1

Certificate
Certificate

CA-2

Certificate
Certificate

CA-3

Certificate
Certificate

In a hybrid model, both a hierarchical structure and cross-certification are employed. For example, two
existing hierarchical communities of trust may want to cross-certify each other, such that members of
each community can rely upon the certificates issued by the other to conduct e-commerce.
What Are Some of the Business Issues Associated with CAs?
Unless they are subject to governmental licensing and regulation, CAs may use different standards or
procedures to verify the identity of persons to whom they issue certificates. Thus a digital signature is
only as reliable as the CA is trustworthy in performing its functions. Consequently, a relying party needs
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some way to gauge how much reliance it should place on a digital signature supported by a certificate
issued by a particular CA.
CA topology (for example, a hierarchical, cross-certified, or a hybrid model) is a developing issue.
Which model is most appropriate depends on the particular business circumstances. Although it is
important that public keys be certified, the issuance of nonstandard certificates can be a concern. For
example, if the broadly recognized International Telecommunications Union-Telecommunication
Standardization Sector’s (ITU-T) X.509 data format standard 2 is not used, subscribers and relying parties
may be unable to process such certificates. Implementing the cross-certified CA model (discussed above)
would also be very difficult. For these reasons, major entities such as the U.S. and Canadian governments
are using or plan to use X.509 certificates for their internal and external activities.
THE WEBTRUST SEAL OF ASSURANCE FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES
The Web has captured the attention of businesses and consumers, causing the number and kinds of
electronic transactions to grow rapidly. Nevertheless, many believe that e-commerce will not reach its
full potential until customers perceive that the risks of doing business electronically have been reduced to
an acceptable level.

Customers may have legitimate concerns about confidentiality, authentication,

integrity, and nonrepudiation. In e-commerce, participants need the assurance of an objective third party.
This assurance can be provided by an independent and objective practitioner and demonstrated through
the display of a WebTrust seal for Certification Authorities on the CA’s Web site.
The WebTrust seal of assurance for Certification Authorities symbolizes to potential relying parties that a
qualified practitioner has evaluated the CA’s business practices and controls to determine whether they
are in conformity with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities,
and has issued a report with an unqualified opinion indicating that such principles are being followed in
conformity with the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria. See Appendix A, “Illustrative
Examples of Practitioner Reports.” These principles and criteria reflect fundamental standards for the
operation of a Certification Authority organization or function.
Practitioners as Assurance Professionals
Practitioners are in the business of providing assurance services, the most publicly recognized of which is
the audit of financial statements. An audit opinion signed by a qualified practitioner is valued because

2 ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997) was also standardized by ISO as ISO/IEC 9594-8.
WebTrust for Certification Authorities

© 2000 AICPA / CICA
Page 19

Version 1.0

these professionals are experienced in assurance matters and financial accounting subject matter and are
recognized for their independence, integrity, discretion, and objectivity.

Practitioners also follow

comprehensive ethics rules and professional standards in providing their services. However, financial
statement assurance is only one of the many kinds of assurance services that can be provided by a
practitioner. Practitioners also provide assurance about controls and compliance with specified criteria.
In general, the business and professional experience, subject matter expertise (e-commerce information
systems security, privacy, auditability, and control) and professional characteristics (independence,
integrity, discretion, and objectivity) needed for such projects are the same key elements that enable a
practitioner to comprehensively and objectively assess the risks, controls, and business disclosures
associated with e-commerce.
Obtaining and Keeping the WebTrust Seal of Assurance for Certification Authorities
The Assurance Process

The CA’s management will make assertions along the following lines:
Management has assessed the controls over its CA operations. Based on that assessment, in ABC
Certification Authority, Inc. (ABC-CA) Management’s opinion, in providing its Certification
Authority (CA) services at LOCATION, ABC-CA, during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000
through Yyyy yy, 2000—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provided such services in accordance with
its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber information was properly authenticated (for the registration
activities performed by ABC-CA) and
- The integrity of keys and certificates it managed was established and
protected throughout their life cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber and relying party information was restricted to authorized
individuals and protected from uses not specified in the CA's business
practices disclosure;
- The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations
was maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly
authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

based on the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria
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For an initial representation, the historical period covered should be at least two months or more as
determined by the practitioner. For established CAs and CA functions, two months may be quite
sufficient, while for new CAs and CA functions, the practitioner may believe that a longer initial period
would be more appropriate. For subsequent representations, the period covered should begin with the end
of the prior period to provide continuous representation with reports issued at least every twelve months.
In some situations, the practitioner may believe a shorter subsequent period would be more appropriate
given the business needs or expectations of relying parties.
In order to have a basis for such assertions, the CA’s management should have made a risk assessment
and implemented appropriate controls for its CA operations. The WebTrust for Certification Authorities
Criteria and illustrative controls provide a basis for a risk assessment and a minimum set of CA controls.
An independent, objective, and knowledgeable practitioner will perform tests of these representations
under AICPA or CICA professional standards 3 and provide a professional opinion, which adds to the
credibility of management’s representations.
Comparison of a WebTrust for Certification Authorities Examination with Service Auditor Reports

Professional standards currently exist for auditors to report on controls of third-party service providers (a
service auditor’s engagement). Guidance for these engagements is set out in the AICPA’s Statement on
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 70, Service Organizations (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU
sec. 324), and the CICA Handbook—Assurance Section 5900, “Opinions on Control Procedures at a
Service Organization.” A WebTrust for Certification Authorities engagement differs from a service
auditor’s engagement in a number of ways including the following:
Purpose–WebTrust for Certification Authorities provides a new framework for reporting activities of
certification authorities through auditor communication to interested parties including business
partners and existing or potential customers. SAS No. 70 and Section 5900 (Service auditor reports)
were designed for auditor-to-auditor communication to assist the user auditor in reporting on the
financial statements of a customer of the service organization.

3 These services are performed in the United States under the AICPA’s Statement on Standards for Attestation
Engagements (SSAE) No 1, Attestation Standards (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 100) or in
Canada under the CICA’s Standards for Assurance Engagements (also known as CICA Handbook, Section 5025).
Practitioners will need the appropriate skills and experience, training in the WebTrust for Certification Authorities
service offering, and a WebTrust business license from the AICPA, CICA, or other authorized national accounting
institute in order to provide the WebTrust for Certification Authorities services to their clients. The practitioner
needs to perform an “examination” (audit) level engagement in order to award the WebTrust seal for Certification
Authorities. A review level engagement is not sufficient.
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Target of evaluation–WebTrust for Certification Authorities was designed specifically for the
examinations of certification authority business activities. Service auditor reports were designed for
service organizations in general.
Type of engagement–WebTrust for Certification Authorities requires reporting on compliance with
the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities. Service auditor
reports were designed for reporting on the design and existence of controls and the effective operation
of those controls when the report covers a period of time.
Examination standards–WebTrust for Certification Authorities follows the Statements on Standards
for Attestation Engagements (U.S.) and Standards for Assurance Engagements (Cdn.) Service auditor
reports follow generally accepted auditing standards.
Coverage of activities–WebTrust for Certification Authorities requires coverage of specific areas
defined by the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities, including CA business
practices disclosure, service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle management activities),
and CA environmental controls. Service auditor reports were designed for reporting upon controls
related to financial information
Linkage to authoritative standards–WebTrust for Certification Authorities provides uniform
standards derived from the draft ANSI X9.79 standard, (which is intended to be submitted to ISO for
international standardization). Standards underlying service auditor reports do not specify the control
objectives that must be covered by the report.
Period of coverage of review–WebTrust for Certification Authorities encourages continuous
coverage from the point of initial qualification and requires continuous coverage in order to retain the
seal. Qualification after compliance can be tested over a minimum two-month period, with updates
over a specified period (currently one-year maximum). Service auditor reports cover a period of time
specified by the service organization, but do not require continuous coverage.
In addition, this approach maintains consistency in the professional standards used for the WebTrust
family of reports. WebTrust for Business-to-Consumer Electronic Commerce, the WebTrust Program for
Certification Authorities, WebTrust-ISP and WebTrust Third Party Service Provider (TPSP) reporting all
use CICA Section 5025 and AICPA AT Section 100 as reporting standards.
A table highlighting the differences between a WebTrust for Certification Authorities engagement and
SAS NO. 70 and Section 5900 engagements is provided in Appendix E, “Comparison of CICA Section
5900, AICPA SAS No. 70, and AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Reports Covering
WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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the Business Activities of Certification Authority Organizations,” of this document.
Obtaining the WebTrust Seal

To obtain the WebTrust seal of assurance, the CA must meet all the WebTrust for Certification
Authorities Principles as measured by the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria associated with
each of these principles. In addition, the entity must (1) engage a practitioner, who has a WebTrust
business license from the AICPA, CICA, or other authorized national accounting institute, to provide the
WebTrust service, and (2) obtain an unqualified report from such practitioner.
Keeping the WebTrust Seal

Once the seal is obtained, the CA will be able to continue displaying it on its Web site provided the
following are performed.
1. The CA’s WebTrust practitioner updates his or her assurance examination of the assertion on a
regular basis. The CA must continue to obtain an unqualified report from such practitioner. The
interval between such updates will depend on matters such as the following:
a) The nature and complexity of the CA’s operations
b) The frequency of significant changes to the CA’s operations
c) The relative effectiveness of the entity’s monitoring and change management controls for
ensuring continued conformity with the applicable WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria
as such changes are made
d) The practitioner’s professional judgment
For example, an update may be required more frequently for a CA whose operation is expanding,
changing extensively and rapidly, or which is issuing high assurance certificates that are used for very
sensitive transmissions or high-value transactions, as compared to a CA that issues few certificates
and has a relatively stable operation. In no event should the interval between updates exceed twelve
months and this interval often may be shorter. For example, in the situation of a start-up CA or CA
function, it may be more appropriate that the initial examination period be established at three
months, with the next review being performed six months after the WebTrust seal for Certification
Authorities is awarded, thereafter moving to a twelve-month review cycle. In order to provide
continuous coverage and retain the seal, the period covered for update reports should either begin
with the end of the prior period or the start of the period in the initial report.
2. During the period between updates, the CA undertakes to inform the practitioner of any significant
changes in its business policies, practices, processes, and controls particularly if such changes might
affect the CA’s ability to continue meeting the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification
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Authorities, or the manner in which they are met. Such changes may trigger the need for an
assurance update or, in some cases, removal of the seal until an update examination by the
practitioner can be made. If the practitioner becomes aware of such a change in circumstances, he or
she would determine whether the seal would need to be removed until an update examination was
completed and the updated auditor’s report is issued.
The Seal Management Process

The WebTrust seal of assurance for the CA will be managed by a Seal Manager along the following lines.
•

Upon becoming a WebTrust Licensee, the WebTrust practitioner obtains a registration number
(ID and password) from the WebTrust licensing authority. With this the practitioner can issue a
WebTrust Seal to the CA.

•

When the practitioner is prepared to issue a WebTrust Seal, the practitioner accesses the
WebTrust secure server system. Upon payment of the registration fee, the practitioner receives
passwords and IDs unique to the engagement. The Seal Manager would issue these to the
practitioner in pairs. One set would allow the practitioner to read and write to the secure server
(see below) and the other would permit the CA to preview the presentation.

•

The practitioner would prepare a draft of the practitioner’s report and provide it along with
management’s assertions for posting to the preview site.

•

The Seal Manager will then deliver the Seal to the CA with the appropriate links to the preview
site. Notification of delivery is provided to the practitioner.

•

When the practitioner and CA have agreed that the Seal should become active, the practitioner
notifies the seal manager to transfer the information from the preview site to the active WebTrust
site and provides the appropriate expiration date.

•

The seal remains valid for the period provided by the practitioner plus a one-month grace period,
unless removed for cause. The one-month period is to allow sufficient time to complete the
engagement and other open items. For example, if the seal expires on June 30, xxxx, the
practitioner has 30 days to complete open items and prepare new documents for posting with the
Seal Manager. The subsequent examination period begins July 1, xxxx.

•

If the practitioner determines that the Seal should be removed from the CA’s Web site, the
practitioner will immediately notify the CA and request that the seal be removed from the CA’s
site. The practitioner will then notify the seal manager to remove all the relevant information and
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to replace it with a statement that the WebTrust seal for this site is no longer valid.
•

The Seal Manager will notify the practitioner 30 days prior to expiration that the Seal needs to be
renewed. The Seal Manager may revoke seals if the registration fee for the seal is unpaid or for
other sufficient cause.

WebTrust Seal Authentication

To verify whether the seal displayed on a CA's Web site is authentic, the customer can:
•

"Click" on the seal and the customer will be linked through a secure connection to a WebTrust
Seal verification page hosted by the Seal Manager. It identifies the CA and confirms that the CA
is entitled to display the WebTrust Seal. It also provides links to the appropriate Principle(s) (i.e.,
the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Principles) and other relevant information.

•

Access the list of entities that have received a WebTrust Seal is maintained by the Seal Manager
at www.webtrust.org/list.htm. A CA is registered on this list when the Seal is issued. For CAs,
the list will identify the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Principles as the specific
Principles for which a WebTrust Seal has been issued.

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

© 2000 AICPA / CICA
Page 25

Version 1.0

WEBTRUST PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES
In order to be understandable to the ultimate users–the subscriber and relying party, the principles set out
in the following sections have been developed with the relying party in mind, and, as a result, are
intended to be practical and nontechnical in nature.
WebTrust for Certification Authorities Principles
CA Business Practices Disclosure

The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management
business and information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with
its disclosed practices.

The Certification Authority must disclose its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices.

Information regarding the CA’s business practices should be made

available to all subscribers and all potential relying parties, typically by posting on its Web site. Such
disclosure may be contained in a Certificate Policy (CP) and/or Certification Practice Statement (CPS), or
other informative materials that are available to users (subscribers and relying parties).
Service Integrity

The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance
that
•

Subscriber information was properly authenticated (for the registration activities
performed by ABC-CA).

•

The integrity of keys and certificates it manages is established and protected
throughout their life cycles.

Effective key management controls and practices are essential to the trustworthiness of the public key
infrastructure. Cryptographic key management controls and practices cover CA key generation, CA key
storage, backup and recovery, CA public key distribution (especially when done in the form of selfsigned “root” certificates), CA key escrow (optional), CA key usage, CA key destruction, CA key
archival, the management of CA cryptographic hardware through its life cycle, and CA-provided
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subscriber key management services (optional). Strong key life cycle management controls are vital to
guard against key compromise which can damage the integrity of the public key infrastructure.
The user certificate lifecycle is at the core of the services provided by the CA. The CA establishes its
standards and practices by which it will deliver services in its published CPS and Certificate Policy(s).
The user certificate lifecycle includes the following:
•

Registration (meaning, the identification and authentication process related to binding the
individual subscriber to the certificate)

•

The renewal of certificates (optional)

•

The rekey of certificates

•

The revocation of certificates

•

The suspension of certificates (optional)

•

The timely publication of certificate status information (through Certificate Revocation Lists or
some form of on-line certificate status protocol)

•

The management of integrated circuit cards (ICCs) holding private keys through their life cycle
(optional)

Effective controls over the registration process are essential, as poor identification and authentication
controls jeopardize the ability of subscribers and relying parties to rely on the certificates issued by the
CA. Effective revocation procedures and timely publication of certificate status information are also
critical elements, as it is critical for subscribers and relying parties to know when they are unable to rely
on certificates that have been issued by the CA.
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CA Environmental Controls

The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance
that
•

Subscriber and relying party information is restricted to authorized individuals and
protected from uses not specified in the CA’s business practices disclosure.

•

The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations is
maintained.

•

CA systems development, maintenance, and operation are properly authorized and
performed to maintain CA systems integrity.

The establishment and maintenance of a trustworthy CA environment is essential to the reliability of the
CA’s business processes. Without strong CA environmental controls, strong key and certificate life cycle
management controls are severely diminished in value. CA environmental controls include CPS and CP
management, security policy management, security management, asset classification and management,
personnel security, physical and environmental security of the CA facility, operations management,
system access management, systems development and maintenance, business continuity management,
monitoring and compliance, and event journaling.
WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria
In order to provide more specific guidance on meeting the WebTrust for Certification Authorities
Principles, the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria have been developed. These provide a
basis against which a CA can make a self-assessment of its conformity with the criteria and provide a
consistent set of measurement criteria for practitioners to use in testing and evaluating CA practices.
The WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria are presented under three principles–CA Business
Practices Disclosure, Service Integrity including key and certificate life cycle management controls, and
CA Environmental Controls.

Within each principle, there are a series of criteria which the CA’s

management asserts that it has achieved. Depending on the scope of services provided by the CA, a
number of the criteria may not be applicable. Those criteria that are considered optional, depending upon
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whether the CA provides the related services are: key escrow, certificate renewal, certificate suspension,
the use of integrated circuit cards (ICCs), and the provision of subscriber key management services. If any
of these services are provided by the CA, then the criteria are applicable and must be tested by the
practitioner. If any of these services are not provided by the CA, then the criteria are not applicable and
no modification of the standard report is necessary. In some situations, some RA services may be
performed by another party that is not controlled by the CA, and therefore the activities of which are not
included in the examination of the CA. In these circumstances, the standard report (United States only)
should be modified to specify the exclusion of the specific RA activities from the scope of the
examination as shown in Appendix A, Illustration No. 2. This may be accomplished by reference to the
CA’s business practice disclosures in which the CA specifies which RA activities it does not control. In
all instances, some RA activities will be performed by the CA and should be tested by the practitioner for
compliance with the controls disclosed in Principle 1 and the criteria specified in Principle 2. 4
In performing, a WebTrust for Certification Authorities engagement, the practitioner must gain an
understanding of the CA’s business model and services provided to determine which control criteria may
not be applicable. For each of the disclosure and control criteria, there is a detailed list of illustrative
disclosures and control procedures that might be followed by the CA to meet the related criteria. The
illustrative disclosure and controls do not necessarily need to be in place in order for a criteria to be met
in a given business circumstance and alternatives may be sufficient.
The CA Business Practices Disclosure criteria were derived primarily from the Internet Engineering Task
Force’s (IETF) Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices
FrameworkRequest For Comments Draft (RFC 2527), which has been incorporated into Annex A of
4 As indicated herein, during development of the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities, the
AICPA/CICA Electronic Commerce Assurance Task Force considered the situations where subscriber registration
is performed by the Certification Authority (CA) itself or by external Registration Authorities (RAs). This version
of the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities has been written such that the RA function
may be "carved out" or considered outside the scope of the WebTrust for Certification Authorities examination
where registration activities are performed by parties external to the CA. For the purpose of some end users, this
approach may not address all requirements for the independent verification of such end users. The Task Force was
well aware of this situation in finalizing the WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities, and the Task Force
concluded that the issuance and use of this standard (version 1.0) was desirable and that the impact of a third party
registration function was beyond the scope of this version of the program. This issue will be considered further in
subsequent revisions to the WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities.
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the draft ANSI X9.79 standard.

For specific key and certificate life cycle management and CA

environmental illustrative controls, in which the CA’s implemented controls may vary depending on the
CA’s business practices, such illustrative controls refer to specifically required CA business practices
disclosures included in Principle 1.
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WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities
PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.
CRITERIA

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

1.1 CA Business Practices Disclosure
The Certification Authority discloses its business
practices, including but not limited to the following:
General
Identification of each CP and CPS for which the CA
issues certificates

1

Community and applicability, including a description
of the types of entities within the PKI and the
applicability of certificates issued by the CA

2

Contact details and administrative provisions,
including:
• Contact person
• Identification of Policy Authority
• Street address
• Version and effective date(s) of each CP and
CPS

3

The CA issues certificates in accordance with the CA’s CPS dated DATE. The CA issues certificates that
support the following Certificate Polices Class 1 Certificate Policy, CA’s Class 2 Certificate Policy, CA’s
Class 3 Certificate Policy, and the Bank Consortium’s Certificate Policy.
The CA is established to provide certificate services for a variety of external customers. The organization
operates a single CA, which issues user certificates to all CA customers. The CA makes use of customer
designated personnel to act as agents to verify the identity of subscribers, in accordance with the indicated
Certificate Policy. Subscribers include all parties who contract with the CA for digital certificate services.
All parties who may rely upon the certificates issued by the CA are considered relying parties.
This CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure) is applicable to all certificates issued by the CA. The
practices described in the CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure) apply to the issuance and use of
certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)for users within the CA domain.
This CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure) is administered by the CA Operations Manager. The
CA’s Certificate Policies are administered by the CA’s Policy Authority. Contact information is listed
below.
The contact details for this CPS are:
CA Operations Manager
ADDRESS
PHONE NUMBER
FAX NUMBER
E-MAIL ADDRESS
The contact details for the CA’s Certificate Policy are:
Policy Authority
ADDRESS
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PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.
CRITERIA

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

Any applicable provisions regarding apportionment
of liability

4

Financial responsibility, including:
• Indemnification by relying parties
• Fiduciary relationships

5

Interpretation and enforcement, including:
• Governing law
• Severability, survival, merger, and notice
• Dispute resolution procedures

6

PHONE NUMBER
FAX NUMBER
E-MAIL ADDRESS
Except as expressly provided otherwise in this CPS, applicable CP, or by statute or regulation, the CA’s
total liability per breach of any express warranties made under this CPS and/or applicable CP is limited to
direct damages having a maximum dollar amount (meaning, a liability cap) of ten thousand dollars. The
liability cap set forth in this CPS or applicable CP shall be the same regardless of the number of digital
signatures, transactions, or claims related to such certificate. Additionally, in the event the liability cap is
exceeded, the available liability cap shall be apportioned first to the earliest claims to achieve final dispute
resolution, unless otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction. In no event shall the CA be
obligated to pay more than the aggregate liability cap for each certificate, regardless of the method of
apportionment among claimants to the amount of the liability cap.
By their applying for and being issued certificates, or otherwise relying upon such certificates, subscribers,
and relying parties, agree to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless the CA, and its personnel, organizations,
entities, subcontractors, suppliers, vendors, representatives, and agents from any errors, omissions, acts,
failures to act, or negligence resulting in liability, losses, damages, suits, or expenses of any kind, due to or
otherwise proximately caused by the use or publication of a certificate that arises from the subscriber’s
failure to provide the CA with current, accurate, and complete information at the time of certificate
application or the subscriber’s errors, omissions, acts, failures to act, and negligence.
The CA and its RAs are not the agents, fiduciaries, trustees, or other representatives of subscribers or
relying parties.
Governing Law:
The laws of JURISDICTION shall govern the enforceability and construction of this CPS (or other CA
business practices disclosure) to ensure uniform procedures and interpretation for all users.
Severability, Survival, Merger, Notice:
Severance or merger may result in changes to the scope, management, and/or operations of this CA. In
such an event, this CPS may require modification as well. Changes to the operations will occur consistent
with the CA’s disclosed CPS management processes.
Dispute resolution procedures:
In the event of any dispute involving the services or provisions covered by this CPS (or other CA business
practices disclosure), the aggrieved party shall first notify the CA and all other relevant parties regarding
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PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.
CRITERIA

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES
the dispute. The CA will involve the appropriate personnel to resolve the dispute.

Fees, including:
• Certificate issuance or renewal fees
• Certificate access fees
• Revocation or status information access fees
• Fees for other services such as policy
information
• Refund policy
Publication and repository requirements, including:
• Publication of CA information
• Frequency of publication
• Access controls

7

The CA may charge subscribers fees for their use of the CA’s services. A current schedule of such fees is
available from the CA’s repository at URL. Such fees are subject to change seven (7) days following their
posting in the CA’s repository.

8

The CA’s CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure) is available at URL. The CA’s Certificate
Policies can be found at URL.

Compliance audit requirements including:
• Frequency of entity compliance audit
• Auditor’s relationship to audited party
• Topics covered by audit
• Actions taken as a result of deficiency
• Communication of results

9

Upon issuance, all public key certificates and CRLs issued by the CA are published in the CA’s directory.
All subscribers and relying parties have access to the CA’s repository.
An annual audit is performed by an independent external auditor to assess the adequacy of the CA’s
business practices disclosure and the effectiveness of the CA’s controls over its certification authority
operations.
Topics covered by the annual audit include the following:
• CA business practices disclosure
• Service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle management controls)
• CA environmental controls
Significant deficiencies identified during the compliance audit will result in a determination of actions to be
taken. This determination is made by the auditor with input from CA management. The CA is responsible
for seeing that corrective action is taken within sixty days. Should a severe deficiency be identified that
might compromise the integrity of the CA, CA management considers, with input from the auditor, whether
suspension of the CA’s operation is warranted.

Description of the conditions for applicability of
certificates issued by the CA that reference a specific
Certificate Policy, including:

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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Compliance audit results are communicated to the Board of Directors of the CA, CA management, and the
CA’s Policy Authority, as well as others deemed appropriate by CA management.
Certificates issued under the CA’s Certificate Policy are limited to use in connection with BANK’s
Consumer Internet Banking application. Certificates issued by the CA may not be used for any other
purpose.
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•

Specific permitted uses for the certificates if
such use is limited to specific applications
• Limitations on the use of certificates if there
are specified prohibited uses for such
certificates
CA and/or RA obligations:
• Notification of issuance of a certificate to the
subscriber who is the subject of the
certificate being issued
• Notification of issuance of a certificate to
others than the subject of the certificate
• Notification of revocation or suspension of a
certificate to the subscriber whose certificate
is being revoked or suspended
• Notification of revocation or suspension of a
certificate to others than the subject whose
certificate is being revoked or suspended.

11

The CA is obligated to
• Conform its operations to the CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure), as the same may
from time to time be modified by amendments published in the CA repository
• Issue and publish certificates in a timely manner in accordance with the relevant Certificate Policy
• Revoke certificates issued by the CA, upon receipt of a valid request to revoke the certificate from
a person authorized to request revocation
• Publish CRLs on a regular basis, in accordance with the applicable Certificate Policy and with
provisions described in the CA’s disclosed business practices (Principle 1, item 35)
• Notify subscribers via e-mail (1) that certificates have been generated for them and (2) how the
subscribers may retrieve the certificates
• In the event the CA is not successful in validating the subscriber’s application in accordance with
the requirements for that class of certificate the CA shall notify the subscriber that the application
has been rejected
• Notify subscribers via email that the subscriber’s certificate has been revoked
• Notify other participants in the PKI of certificate issuance revocation through access to certificates
and CRLs in the CA repository

RA obligations, including:
• Identification and authentication of
subscribers
• Validation of revocation and suspension
requests
• Verification of subscriber renewal or rekey
requests

12

The RAs (or the CA’s RA function) are obligated to
• Verify the accuracy and authenticity of the information provided by the subscriber at the time of
application, in accordance with the relevant Certificate Policy.
• Validate and securely send a revocation request to the CA upon receipt of a request to revoke a
certificate, in accordance with the relevant Certificate Policy.
• Verify the accuracy and authenticity of the information provided by the subscriber at the time of
renewal or rekey, in accordance with the relevant Certificate Policy.

Repository obligations, including:
• Timely publication of certificates and
Certificate Revocation Lists
Subscriber obligations, including:
• Accuracy of representations in certificate

13

The CA’s repository function is obligated to publish certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists in a
timely manner.

14

Subscribers are obligated to
• Provide information to the CA that is accurate and complete to the best of the subscribers’

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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application
Protection of the subscriber’s private key
Restrictions on private key and certificate
use
Notification upon private key compromise

Relying party obligations, including:
• Purposes for which certificate is used
• Digital signature verification responsibilities
• Revocation and suspension checking
responsibilities
• Acknowledgment of applicable liability caps
and warranties
Any applicable reliance or financial limits for
certificate usage
Key Life Cycle Management

15

CA key pair generation, including:
• What key sizes are required
• What key generation algorithm is required
• Whether key generation is performed in
hardware or software
• What standards are required for the module
used to generate the keys (for example, the
required ISO 15782-1/FIPS 140-1/ANSI
X9.66 level of the module)
• For what purposes the key may be used
• For what purposes usage of the key should
be restricted
• The usage periods or active lifetimes for the
CA public and the private key, respectively
CA private key protection including:
• What standards are required for the module
used to store the CA private signature key

17

16

knowledge and belief regarding information in their certificates and identification and
authentication information and promptly notify the CA of any changes to this information;
• Safeguard their private key from compromise.
• Use certificates exclusively for legal purposes and in accordance with the relevant Certificate
Policy and this CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure).
• Promptly request that the CA revoke a certificate if the subscriber has reason to believe there has
been a compromise of their private key corresponding to the public key listed in the certificate.
Relying parties are obligated to
• Restrict reliance on certificates issued by the CA to the purposes for those certificates, in
accordance with the relevant Certificate Policy and with this CPS (or other CA business practices
disclosure).
• Verify the status of certificates at the time of reliance.
• Agree to be bound by the provisions of limitations of liability as described in the CPS (or other
CA business practices disclosure) upon reliance on a certificate issued by the CA.
Certificates issued under the CA’s Certificate Policy may only be used in connection with transactions
having a dollar value of no more than $100,000.
The CA’s signing key pair is 1024 bit using the RSA algorithm.
Hardware key generation is used and is compliant to at least FIPS 140-1 level 3.
The CA’s signing key is used to sign certificates and CRLs.
The lifetime of the CA signing key pair is five years.

18

Hardware cryptographic modules for generating and storing the CA’s root key are certified to FIPS 140-1
Level 3.
There is a separation of physical and logical access to the CA’s root private key. Two individuals provide

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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(for example, the required ISO 157821/FIPS 140-1/ANSI X9.66 level of the
module)
• Whether the CA private key is maintained
under m out of n multiperson control
• Whether the CA private signature key is
escrowed
• Whether the CA private signing key is
backed up
• Whether the CA private and public signature
keys are archived
Whether the CA provides subscriber key management
services and a description of the services provided

dual control over physical access to the hardware modules; m of n secret shares held by other, separate
custodians on removable media are required for logical activation of the private keys.
The CA’s private signing key is backed up only on hardware certified to FIPS 140-1 Level 3 and is stored
with two-person control enforced.
Escrow of CA private keys by an external third party is not performed.
The CA’s private signing key and expired (and revoked) CA public key certificates are archived.

19

CA public key distribution, including a description of
how the CA’s public key is provided securely to
subscribers and relying parties
Key changeover, including a description of the
procedures used to provide a new public key to a
CA’s users

20

Subscriber key pair generation (if the CA provides
subscriber key pair generation services), including:
• How the subscriber’s private key is provided
securely to the subscriber
• What key sizes are required
• What key generation algorithm is required
• Whether key pair generation is performed in
hardware or software
• What standards are required for the module
used to generate the keys (for example, the
required ISO 15782-1/FIPS 140-1/ANSI
X9.66 level of the module)

22

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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The CA provides subscriber key management services including the following:
• Subscriber key generation
• Subscriber key storage, backup and recovery
• Subscriber key archival
• Subscriber key destruction
The CA’s public key is delivered in a self-signed certificate to subscribers using an encrypted session
between the CA and the subscriber’s client software, with an authorization code as a shared secret.
Authenticity and integrity protection is based on a MAC key derived from the authorization code.
The CA root signing private key has a lifetime of two years and the corresponding public key certificate
has a lifetime of four years. Upon the end of the private key’s lifetime, a new CA signing key pair is
generated and all subsequently issued certificates and CRLs are signed with the new private signing key.
The corresponding new CA public key certificate is securely provided to subscribers and relying parties.
For subscribers, the CA creates an encryption key pair and the corresponding encryption public key
certificate.
For subscribers, the encryption key pair is provided securely to the user via an encrypted session between
the CA and the subscriber’s client software.
Subscriber encryption key pairs are 1024 bit using the RSA algorithm.
The CA’s process for generating subscriber encryption key pairs uses the CA system software and is
designed to comply with FIPS 140-1 level 1.
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•

For what purposes the key may be used
For what purposes usage of the key should
be restricted
Subscriber private key protection (if the CA provides
subscriber key management services), including:
• Whether the subscriber’s decryption private
key is backed up
• Whether the subscriber’s decryption private
key is archived
• Under what conditions a subscriber’s private
key can be destroyed
• Whether subscriber private decryption keys
are escrowed by the CA.
Certificate Life Cycle Management
Whether certificate suspension is supported
Initial registration, including a description of the
CA’s requirements for the identification and
authentication of subscribers and validation of
certificate requests during entity registration or
certificate issuance:
• Types of names assigned to the subject and
rules for interpreting various name forms
• Whether names have to be meaningful or not
• Whether names have to be unique
• How name claim disputes are resolved
• Recognition, authentication, and role of
trademarks
• If and how the subject must prove possession
of the companion private key for the public
key being provided for a certificate
• How the subscriber’s public key is provided
securely to the CA for issuance of a
certificate
• Authentication requirements for
organizational identity of subject
WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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Subscriber encryption private keys generated by the CA are backed up in the CA database. The CA
database is encrypted and its integrity is protected by master keys. Subscriber signature private keys are
generated by the subscriber and are not known or stored by the CA.
The encryption key pair history for all users, including a complete history of all decryption private keys is
stored encrypted in the CA database.
Subscriber encryption private keys stored by the CA are not destroyed.
Escrow of subscriber private keys is not performed by the CA.

24
25

The CA does not support suspension of certificates.
The CA has established a single naming hierarchy utilizing the X.500 Distinguished Name form.
In all cases, names of subjects must be meaningful. Generally, the name by which a subscriber is
commonly known to the CA should be used. The CA does not support the use of pseudonyms in
subscriber common names.
All subjects in the CA’s PKI are unambiguously identified in the naming hierarchy.
When there is a conflict in distinguished names such as a second “John Doe,” then a middle initial, middle
name, or other modification acceptable to the subscriber may be used to make the name unique.
The CA issues certificates within a closed PKI. Trademarks and related naming issues will generally not
apply to certificates issued within this space.
Possession of a private key is proved by a certificate applicant by providing check values as defined in the
Certificate Policy.
If organizational identity is considered important based upon the Certificate Policy, the organization
identity is verified using a method approved by the Certificate Policy.

© 2000 AICPA / CICA
Page 37

Version 1.0

PRINCIPLE 1: CA Business Practices Disclosure - The Certification Authority discloses its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provides its services in accordance with its disclosed practices.
CRITERIA
•
•
•
•
•

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES
The requirements for authentication of individual identity is defined by the Certificate Policy <hot link to
Certificate Policy>.

Authentication of individual identity
Required certificate request data
How the CA verifies the authority of the
subscriber to request a certificate
How the CA verifies the accuracy of the
information included in the subscriber’s
certificate request
Whether the CA checks certificate requests
for errors or omissions

In submitting a certificate application, at least the following information must be submitted to the CA:
subscriber’s public key, subscriber’s Distinguished Name, and other information required on the CA’s
certificate application form.
If required by the Certificate Policy, the CA verifies the authority of the subscriber to request a certificate
by checking whether the subscriber is an employee of a particular organization or association through
inquiry of the organization’s HR department or the association’s membership department.
The CA verifies the accuracy of the information included in the subscriber’s certificate request though
validation against a third-party database.

Registration requirements where external Registration
Authorities are used, including the CA’s procedures
for:
• Validating the identity of external
Registration Authorities
• Authorizing external Registration
Authorities
• Requirements for the external Registration
Authority to secure that part of the certificate
application, certificate renewal, and
certificate rekey processes for which the RA
assumes responsibility
• How the CA verifies the authenticity of
certificate request submissions received from
an external RA
Certificate renewal, including a description of the
CA’s procedures for the following:
• Notifying subscribers of the need for
renewal
• Identification and authentication
• Renewal request verification
WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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The CA checks certificate requests for errors or omissions.
The CA requires that external RAs physically present themselves along with two forms of identification to
an employee of the CA.
The CA authorized external RAs upon successful identification and authentication and approval of the
external RA enrollment and certificate application forms.
External RAs are responsible for identification and authentication of subscribers and must secure their
private signing keys used for signing certificate applications, securely forward certificate applications to
the CA, and securely store any subscriber information collected.
The CA verifies the authenticity of certificate request submissions received from an external RA by
validating the RA’s digital signature on the submission.

27

The certificate renewal process is similar to an application for a new certificate. However, the subscriber
only needs to provide information that has changed.
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Routine rekey, including a description of the
identification and authentication and rekey request
verification procedures

28

Authentication of the individual’s identity as defined in the CA’s identification and authentication
requirements for initial registration need not be repeated unless required by the applicable Certificate
Policy. Subscribers will be limited to rekeying no more than twice before repeating the authentication
process defined in identification and authentication requirements for initial registration.

Rekey after revocation or expiration, including a
description of the identification and authentication
and rekey request verification procedures for rekey
after the subject certificate has been revoked
Certificate issuance, including a description of the
requirements regarding the following:
• Issuance of a certificates
• Notification to the applicant of such issuance
• Certificate format requirements
• Validity period requirements
• Extension field requirements (meaning,
what extension fields are honored, and how
they are to be populated)
Certificate acceptance, including a description of the
requirements regarding acceptance of an issued
certificate and for consequent publication of
certificates
Certificate distribution, including a description of the
CA’s established mechanism (for example, a
repository such as a directory) for making available to
relying parties the certificates and Certificate
Revocation Lists that it issues
Certificate revocation, including:
• Circumstances under which a certificate may
or must be revoked
• Identification and authentication procedures
required for revocation requests
• Procedures used for initiation, authorization,
and verification of certificate revocation
requests

29

For subscribers whose certificates have been revoked or have expired, rekey is permitted if the
identification and authentication requirements for initial registration are repeated.

30

Certificates are issued to the subscribers upon successful processing of the application and the acceptance
of the certificates by the subscribers. Certificate format, validity period, extension field, and key usage
extension field requirements are specified in accordance with the CA’s disclosed certificate profile.

31

Once a certificate has been generated, it is maintained in a secure remote repository until it is retrieved by
the subscriber. Upon retrieval of the certificate from the secure remote repository, the certificate status is
updated to reflect its status as accepted and valid.

32

A single repository operated for all subscribers and relying parties. All certificates issued by the CA and
all CRLs relating thereto, shall be published in the repository. The repository for this CA is provided by an
X.500 directory system. The protocol used to access the directory is the Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP) version 2.

33

A certificate can be revoked for several reasons including suspected or actual compromise of control of the
private key that relates to the public key contained in the certificate, hardware or software failures that
render the private key inoperable, or failure of a subscriber to meet the obligations of this CPS and the
related CP. Other circumstances for revocation may be stipulated in the particular CP and may relate to
changes in a subscriber’s relationship with the CA, such as a change in customer or employee status or a
change in the particular role of an employee.

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

Revocation may be requested by the subscriber, RA, or CA. Requests by Registration Authority personnel
to revoke a certificate require sufficient RA system access rights. Requests by subscribers to revoke their
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own certificates require one of the following:
• A digitally signed message from the subscriber to the RA
• Personal presentation of the subscriber to the RA with a personal photo ID card
• Presentation of the passphrase created by the subscriber at the point of initial application
• Other means as provided in the Certificate Policy

Revocation request grace period available to
the subscriber
Any variations on the preceding stipulations
in the event that the revocation is the result
of private key compromise (as opposed to
other reasons for revocation)
Procedures to provide a means of rapid
communication to facilitate the secure and
authenticated revocation of: (1) one or more
certificates of one or more entities; (2) the
set of all certificates issued by a CA based
on a single public/private key pair used by a
CA to generate certificates; and (3) all
certificates issued by a CA, regardless of the
public/private key pair used
Procedures for notifying the subscriber upon
revocation of the subscriber’s certificate
Whether the external Registration Authority
is notified upon the revocation of a
subscriber’s certificate for which the
revocation request was processed by the
external RA
How and when the subscriber’s certificate
status information is updated upon certificate
revocation

A subscriber can request a certificate revocation on-line, via email or by telephone to the CA. If the
request is made on-line and the end entity supplies the correct challenge phase, the certificate is revoked
immediately. Certificate revocation requests made via email or telephone are processed on a daily basis by
the CA after the validity of such requests are ascertained. Validation procedures for telephone and email
revocation requests are defined in the Certificate Policy. Validated certificate revocation requests will be
processed no more than twenty-four hours after receipt. The Certificate Policy may define a shorter time
period for the processing of revocation requests.
Revocation requests for reasons other than key compromise must be placed within a maximum of fortyeight hours of the event necessitating revocation. In the case of suspected or known private key
compromise, revocation request should be made immediately upon identification of the event.
The CA’s certificate revocation process supports the secure and authenticated revocation of one or more
certificates of one or more entities and provides a means of rapid communication of such revocation
through the issuance of daily CRLs (or if necessary, more frequent CRLs). The CA’s system and processes
provide the capability to revoke (1) the set of all certificates issued by the CA that have been signed with a
single CA private signing key or (2) groups of certificates issued by the CA that have been signed with
different CA private signing keys.
Upon revocation of the subscriber’s certificate, the subscriber is notified via email.
When a revocation request has been processed by an external RA, the external Registration Authority is
also notified upon the revocation of a subscriber’s certificate.
Upon the revocation of a subscriber’s certificate, the newly revoked certificate is recorded in the next CRL
that is issued.

Certificate suspension, including:
• Circumstances under which a certificate may
or must be suspended
WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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The CA does not support certificate suspension.
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•

Identification and authentication procedures
required for revocation requests
• Procedures used for initiation, authorization,
and verification of certificate suspension
requests
• How long the suspension may last
• Circumstances under which the suspension
of a certificate may or must be lifted
• Authorization criteria to request the lifting of
a certificate suspension
• Any variations on the preceding stipulations
if the suspension is the result of private key
compromise (as opposed to other reasons for
suspension)
• Procedures to provide a means of rapid
communication to facilitate the secure and
authenticated suspension of: (1) one or more
certificates of one or more entities; (2) the
set of all certificates issued by a CA based
on a single public/private key pair used by a
CA to generate certificates; and (3) all
certificates issued by a CA, regardless of the
public/private key pair used
• Procedures for notifying the subscriber upon
suspension of the subscriber’s certificate
• Whether the external RA is notified upon the
suspension of a subscriber’s certificate for
which the suspension request was processed
or submitted by the external RA
• How and when the subscriber’s certificate
status information is updated upon certificate
suspension and the lifting of a certificate
suspension
Provision of certificate status information, including:
• What mechanism is used (CRLs, OCSP,

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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The CA issues CRLs once a day at 11:59 PM. In addition, the CA may issue interim CRLs in the event
that personnel of the CA deem it necessary (meaning, in the event of a serious private key compromise) or
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other)
If a CRL mechanism is used, the issuance
frequency
Requirements on relying parties to check
CRLs
On-line revocation/status checking
availability
Requirements on relying parties to perform
on-line revocation/status checks
Other forms of revocation advertisements
available
Requirements on relying parties to check
other forms of revocation advertisements
Any variations on the above stipulations
when the suspension or revocation is the
result of private key compromise (as
opposed to other reasons for suspension or
revocation)
The CA’s requirements for archival and
retention of CRLs or other certificate status
information
Whether copies of all certificates issued
(including all expired, revoked or suspended
certificates) are retained and disclosure of
the retention period
If an online status mechanism is used (for
example, OCSP), certificate status request
content requirements
If an online status mechanism is used (for
example, OCSP), definitive response
message data content requirements
What key is used to digitally sign definitive
response messages
Whether the CA signs error messages when
returned in response to certificate status

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES
as dictated by Certificate Policy.
As stated in the Certificate Policy, CRL checking is required for all relying parties.
A subscriber is notified of the revocation of his or her certificate by email, postal mail, or telephone. The
CP may define other forms of revocation advertisements.
The CA archives and retains all certificates and CRLs issued by the CA for a period not less than ten years.
The CA also supports on-line certificate revocation checking using Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP).
The CA requires that OCSP requests contain the following data:
• protocol version
• service request
• target certificate identifier
• optional extensions which may be processed by the OCSP Responder.
Definitive OCSP response messages include the following:
• version of the response syntax
• name of the responder
• responses for each of the certificates in a request (including target certificate identifier, certificate
status value, response validity interval, and optional extensions)
• optional extensions
• signature algorithm OID
• signature computed across hash of the response.
All definitive response messages are digitally signed with a key belonging to the CA that issued the
certificate in question.
When the CA returns an error message in response to a certificate status request, the error message is not
digitally signed.
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Certificate profile, including:
• Version number(s) supported
• Certificate extensions populated and their
criticality
• Cryptographic algorithm object identifiers
• Name forms (meaning, naming hierarchy
used to ensure that the certificate subject can
be uniquely identified - if required) used for
the CA, RA, and subscribers names
• Name constraints used and the name forms
used in the name constraints
• Applicable Certificate Policy Object
Identifier(s)
• Usage of the policy constraints extension
• Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics and
• Processing semantics for the critical
Certificate Policy extension
CRL profile, including:
• Version numbers supported for CRLs
• CRL and CRL entry extensions populated
and their criticality

Integrated circuit card (ICC) life cycle management,
including:
• Whether ICCs are issued by the CA (or RA)
• If supported, a description of the CA’s ICC
life cycle management processes, including a
description of the ICC distribution process
CA Environmental Controls

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

36

The following fields in the X.509 certificate format are utilized in the CA’s PKI:
• Version–Set to v3
• Serial number–Unique values for each certificate in the CA domain
• Signature algorithm identifierThe algorithm used by the CA for signing the certificate
• Issuer–Identification of the certificate issuer
• Validity–Start date and end date of the validity period are defined
• Subject–Certificate subject’s distinguished name
• Public key information–Algorithm identifier (meaning, RSA with SHA-1) and public key
• Issuer unique identifier
• Subject unique identifier
• Extensions

37

The following fields of the X.509 CRL format are utilized by the CA:
• Version–v2
• Signature–Identifies algorithm used to sign CRL
• Issuer–Identification of the CA issuing the CRL
• This update–Time of CRL issue
• Next update–Time of next anticipated CRL issue
• Revoked certificates–Listing of information for revoked certificates

38

The CA may alternatively support on-line certificate status and revocation checking services.
The CA does not issue smart cards to subscribers. Subscribers may, at their own discretion, purchase smart
cards and readers for purposes of key generation and storage.
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39

Some revisions to this CPS may be deemed by the CA’s Policy Authority to have minimal or no impact on
subscribers and relying parties using certificates and CRLs issued by CA. Such revisions may be made
without notice to users of the CPS and without changing the version number of this CPS. Revisions to the
certificate policies supported by this CPS, as well as revisions to the CPS which are deemed by the CA’s
Policy Authority to have significant impact on the users of this CPS, may be made with forty-five days
notice to the users and a change in version number for this CPS.
Forty-five days prior to significant revisions to this CPS, the CA’s Policy Authority will provide
notification of upcoming changes on the CA’s Web site.

CA termination, including a description of the CA’s
procedures for termination and for termination
notification of a CA or RA, including the identity of
the custodian of CA and RA archival records
Confidentiality, including:
• Applicable statutory or regulatory
requirements to keep information
confidential
• Kinds of information to be kept confidential
• Kinds of information not considered
confidential
• Disclosure of information concerning
certificate revocation and suspension
• Release to law enforcement officials
• Release as part of civil discovery
• Disclosure upon owner’s request
• Other information release circumstances

40

41

This CPS and any subsequent changes are approved by the CA’s Policy Authority.
The CA can only be terminated by the Board of Director’s of the CA. In the event the CA is terminated, all
certificates issued under the CA will be revoked and the CA will cease to issue certificates. The CA will
provide no less than one month notice to all business units utilizing the services of the CA. Upon
termination, the records of the CA will be archived and transferred to a specified custodian.
Information, which is not considered by the CA to be public domain information, is to be kept confidential.
Confidential information, including:
•
•
•
•

Subscribers’ private signing keys are confidential and are not provided to the CA or RA.
Information specific to the operation and control of the CA, such as security parameters and audit
trails, is maintained confidentially by the CA and is not released outside of the CA organization
unless required by law.
Information about subscribers held by the CA or RAs, excluding that which is published in
certificates, CRLs, certificate policies, or this CPS is considered confidential and shall not be
released outside of the CA except as required by Certificate Policy or otherwise required by law.
Generally, the results of annual audits are kept confidential, unless disclosure is deemed necessary
by CA management.

Nonconfidential information, including:
• Information included in certificates and CRLs issued by the CA is not considered confidential.
• Information in the certificate policies supported by this CA is not considered confidential.
• Information in the CA’s disclosed CPS (or other CA business practices disclosure) is not
considered confidential.
• When the CA revokes a certificate, a revocation reason is included in the CRL entry for the
revoked certificate. This revocation reason code is not considered confidential and can be shared
with all other subscribers and relying parties. However, no other details concerning the revocation
WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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are normally disclosed.
The CA will comply with legal requirements to release information to law enforcement officials.

Intellectual property rights

42

Physical security controls, including:
• Site location and construction
• Physical access controls, including
authentication controls to control and restrict
access to CA facilities
• Power and air conditioning
• Water exposures
• Fire prevention and protection
• Media storage
• Waste disposal
• Off-site backup

43

The CA may disclose to another party information pertaining to the owner of such information upon the
owner’s request.
Public key certificates and CRLs issued by the CA are the property of the CA. This CPS and the related
certificate policies are the property of the CA.
All critical CA operations take place within a physically secure facility with at least four layers of security
to access sensitive hardware or software. Such systems are physically separated from the organization’s
other systems so that only authorized employees of the CA can access them.
Physical access to the CA systems is strictly controlled. Only trustworthy individuals with a valid business
reason are provided such access. The access control system is always functional and utilizes proximity
cards and biometrics for access.
All CA systems have industry standard power and air conditioning systems to provide a suitable operating
environment.
All CA systems have reasonable precautions taken to minimize the impact of water exposure.
All CA systems have industry standard fire prevention and protection mechanisms in place.
Media storage at the CA third-party processor is subject to the same degree of protection as the CA
hardware. Media storage under the control of the CA is subject to the normal media storage requirements
of the company.
Waste is disposed of in accordance with the organization’s normal waste disposal requirements.
Cryptographic devices are physically destroyed or zeroized in accordance the manufacturers’ guidance
prior to disposal.

Business continuity management controls, including:
• Whether the CA has business continuity
plans to maintain or restore the CA’s
WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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Off-site backups are stored in a physically secure manner by a bonded third-party storage facility.
The CA has a business continuity plan to restore the CA’s business operations in a reasonably timely
manner following interruption to, or failure of critical business processes. The CA’s business continuity
plan defines twenty-four hours as an acceptable system outage time in the event of a major natural disaster
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ILLUSTRATIVE DISCLOSURES

business operations in a reasonably timely
manner following interruption to or failure
of critical business processes
• Whether the CA’s business continuity plans
define an acceptable system outage and
recovery time and disclosure of the defined
time period(s)
• How frequently back-up copies of essential
business information and software are taken
• Proximity of recovery facilities to the CA’s
main site
Event logging, including the following:
• How frequently the CA archives event
journal data
• How frequently event journals are reviewed

or CA private key compromise.

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

Copies of essential business information and CA system software are performed daily.
The CA maintains a recovery site which is located approximately fifty miles from the CA’s primary site.

45

As part of the CA’s scheduled system back up procedures, audit trail files are backed up to media on at
least a daily basis. Audit trail files are archived by the system administrator on a weekly basis.
Event journals are reviewed at least on a weekly basis by CA management.
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ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)

2.1 Key Life Cycle Management Controls
2.1.1 CA Key Generation
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA key pairs are
generated in accordance with industry standards.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

CA key generation occurs within a secure cryptographic device meeting the appropriate ISO 15782-1/FIPS
140-1/ANSI X9.66 level requirement as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (See Principle 1, item 18).

2

CA key generation by the CA requires dual control by properly authorized personnel.

3

The CA generates its own key pair in the same cryptographic device in which it will be used or the key pair
is injected directly from the device where it was generated into the device in which it will be used.
Key generation uses a random number generator (RNG) or pseudo random number generator (PRNG) as
specified in an ANSI X9 or ISO standard.
Key generation uses a prime number generator as specified in an ANSI X9 or ISO standard.

4
5
6
7
8
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Key generation uses a key generation algorithm as specified in an ANSI X9 or ISO standard as disclosed in
the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 18).
Key generation results in key sizes as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 18).
The integrity of the hardware/software used for key generation and the interfaces to the hardware and
software are tested before usage.
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CRITERIA

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)

2.1.2 CA Key Storage, Backup and Recovery
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA private keys
remain confidential and maintain their integrity.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

The CA’s private signing key is stored within a secure cryptographic device meeting the appropriate ISO
15782-1/FIPS 140-1/ANSI X9.66 level requirement as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1
item 17).

2

If the CA private key is not exported from a secure cryptographic module and moved to secure storage for
purposes of offline processing or backup and recovery, then the CA private key is generated and used
within the same cryptographic module and is never exported outside of the cryptographic module.
If the CA private key is exported from a secure cryptographic module and moved to secure storage for
purposes of offline processing or backup and recovery, then the private key is exported in a secure key
management scheme including any of the following:

3

4
5
6
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a.

As ciphertext using dual control

b.

As encrypted key fragments using dual control and split knowledge/ownership

c. In another secure cryptographic module such as a key transportation device using dual control
The CA private key is backed up, stored, and recovered by authorized personnel using dual control in a
physically secured environment.
If the CA’s private signing key is backed up, backup copies of the CA private keys are subject to the same
or greater level of security controls as keys currently in use.
If the CA’s private signing key is backed up, recovery of the CA private key is conducted in the same
secure schema used in the backup process, using dual control.
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ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)

2.1.3 CA Public Key Distribution
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the integrity and
authenticity of the CA public key and any associated
parameters are maintained during initial and
subsequent distribution.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

The CA provides a mechanism for detecting the modification of the CA’s public key during the initial
distribution process (for example, using a self-signed certificate).

2

The initial distribution mechanism for the CA’s public key is controlled as disclosed in the CA’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 20).
CA public keys are initially distributed using one of the following methods as disclosed in any one of the
following CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 20):
a. Machine readable media (for example, smart card)

3

b.
4
5
6
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Embedding in an entity’s cryptographic module

c. Other secure means
The CA’s public key is changed (rekeyed) periodically as disclosed in the CA’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 21).
The subsequent distribution mechanism for the CA’s public key is controlled as disclosed in the CA’s
business practices (Principle 1, item 21).
If an entity already has an authenticated copy of the CA’s public key, a new CA public key is distributed
using one of the following methods as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 21):
a.

Direct electronic transmission from the CA

b.

Placing into a remote cache or directory

c.

Loading into a cryptographic module

d.

Any of the methods used for initial distribution
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2.1.4 CA Key Escrow (Optional)
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that escrowed CA
private signing keys remain confidential.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

If a third party provides CA private key escrow services, a contract outlining the liabilities and remedies
between the parties exists.

2

If CA private signing keys are held in escrow, escrowed copies of the CA private signing keys are subject
to the same or greater level of security controls as keys currently in use.

2.1.5 CA Key Usage
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA keys are used
only for their intended functions in their intended
locations.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

The activation of the CA private signing key is performed using multi-party control (meaning, m of n).

2

If necessary based on a risk assessment, the activation of the CA private signing key is performed using
multi-factor authentication (for example, smart card and password, biometric and password).
The CA ceases to use a key pair at the end of the cryptoperiod or when the compromise of the private key
is known or suspected.

3

2.1.6 CA Key Destruction
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA keys are
completely destroyed at the end of the key pair life
cycle.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

Authorization to destroy a CA private key and how the CA’s private key is destroyed (for example, token
surrender, token destruction, or key overwrite) are limited as disclosed in the CA’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 17).

2

All copies and fragments of the CA’s private key are destroyed at the end of the key pair life cycle.

3

If a secure cryptographic device is accessible and known to be permanently removed from service, all CA
private keys stored within the device that have ever been or potentially could be used for any cryptographic
purpose are destroyed.
If a CA cryptographic device is being permanently removed from service, then any key contained within
the device that has been used for any cryptographic purpose is erased from the device.

4
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ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)
5

2.1.7 CA Key Archival
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that archived CA keys
remain confidential and are never put back into
production.

If a CA cryptographic device case is intended to provide tamper-evident characteristics and the device is
being permanently removed from service, then the case is destroyed.
Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

1

Archived CA keys are subject to the same or greater level of security controls as keys currently in use.

2
3

All archived CA keys are destroyed at the end of the archive period using dual control in a physically
secure site.
Archived keys are never put back into production.

4

Archived keys are recovered for the shortest time period technically permissible.

5

Archived keys are periodically verified to ensure that they are properly destroyed at the end of the archive
period.
For purposes of this section, CA cryptographic hardware refers to devices containing CA private signing
keys.

2.1.8 CA Cryptographic Hardware Life Cycle
Management

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that access to CA
cryptographic hardware is limited to properly
authorized individuals.

1

Policies and procedures require that CA cryptographic hardware be sent from the manufacturer via
registered mail using tamper evident packaging.

2

Upon the receipt of CA cryptographic hardware from the manufacturer, authorized CA personnel inspect
the tamper evident packaging to determine whether the seal is intact.
To prevent tampering, CA cryptographic hardware is stored in a secure site, with access limited to
authorized personnel, having the following characteristics:

3
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a.

Inventory control processes and procedures to manage the origination, arrival, condition,
departure, and destination of each device

b.

Access control processes and procedures to limit physical access to authorized personnel
© 2000 AICPA / CICA
Page 51

Version 1.0

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
• Subscriber information was properly authenticated (for the registration activities performed by ABC-CA) and
• The integrity of keys and certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.
CRITERIA
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4
5
6
7
8
9
10
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA cryptographic
hardware is functioning correctly.

11

12
13
14
15

2.1.9 CA-Provided Subscriber Key Management
Services (Optional)
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c.

All successful or failed access attempts to the CA facility and device storage mechanism (for
example, a safe) are recorded in an event journal

d.

Incident processes and procedures to handle abnormal events, security breaches, and
investigation and reports

e. Audit processes and procedures to verify the effectiveness of the controls
CA cryptographic hardware is stored in tamper resistant packages.
The handling of CA cryptographic hardware is performed in the presence of no less than two trusted
employees.
The installation of CA cryptographic hardware is performed in the presence of no less than two trusted
employees.
The removal of CA cryptographic hardware from production is performed in the presence of no less than
two trusted employees.
The process whereby CA cryptographic hardware is serviced or repaired with new hardware, firmware, or
software is performed in the presence of no less than two trusted employees.
The service or repair site is a secure site with inventory control and access limited to authorized personnel.
The process whereby CA cryptographic hardware is disassembled and permanently removed from use is
performed in the presence of no less than two trusted employees.
Upon the receipt of CA cryptographic hardware from the manufacturer, acceptance testing and verification
of firmware settings is performed.
Upon the receipt of CA cryptographic hardware that has been serviced or repaired, acceptance testing and
verification of firmware settings is performed.
Devices used for private key storage and recovery and the interfaces to these devices are tested before
usage for integrity.
Correct processing of CA cryptographic hardware is verified on a periodic basis.
Diagnostic support is provided during troubleshooting of CA cryptographic hardware in the presence of no
less than two trusted employees.
For purposes of this section, subscriber includes external Registration Authorities.
Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
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CRITERIA
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that subscriber keys
generated by the CA (or RA) are generated in
accordance with industry standards.

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)
1

Subscriber key generation performed by the CA (or RA) occurs within a secure cryptographic device
meeting the appropriate ISO 15782-1/FIPS 140-1/ANSI X9.66 level requirement as disclosed in the CA’s
business practices (Principle 1, item 18).

2

Subscriber key generation performed by the CA (or RA) uses a random number generator (RNG) or pseudo
random number generator (PRNG) as specified in an ANSI X9 or ISO standard
Subscriber key generation performed by the CA (or RA) uses a prime number generator as specified in an
ANSI X9 or ISO standard.

3
4

Subscriber key generation performed by the CA (or RA) uses a key generation algorithm as specified in an
ANSI X9 or ISO standard as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 18).

5

Subscriber key generation performed by the CA (or RA) results in key sizes as disclosed in the CA’s
business practices (Principle 1, item 18).
Subscriber key generation performed by the CA (or RA) is performed by authorized personnel as disclosed
in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 18).
When subscriber key generation is performed by the CA (or RA), the CA (or RA) securely (confidentially)
delivers the key pair(s) generated by the CA (or RA) on behalf of the subscriber to the subscriber as
disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 18).
Subscriber private keys stored by the CA are stored in encrypted form using a cryptographic algorithm and
key length based on a risk assessment and the business requirements of the CA.

6
7

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that subscriber private
keys stored by the CA remain confidential and
maintain their integrity.

8

9
10
11
12
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If the CA generates key pair(s) on behalf of a subscriber, the CA ensures that subscriber’s private keys are
not disclosed to any entity other than the owner of the keys.
If the CA generates public/private digital signature key pair(s), the CA does not maintain a copy of any
digital signature private key, once that key is delivered to the subscriber
If the CA provides subscriber key storage, backup and recovery, subscriber private key backup and
recovery is performed only by authorized personnel.
If the CA provides subscriber key storage, backup and recovery, controls exist to ensure that the integrity
of the subscriber’s private key is maintained throughout its life cycle.
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CRITERIA
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that subscriber keys
stored by the CA are completely destroyed at the end
of the key pair life cycle.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that subscriber keys
archived by the CA remain confidential.

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)
13

If the CA provides subscriber key storage, authorization to destroy a subscriber’s private key and the
means to destroy the subscriber’s private key (for example., key overwrite) are limited as disclosed in the
CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 22).

14

If the CA provides subscriber key storage, all copies and fragments of the subscriber’s private key are
destroyed at the end of the key pair life cycle.
Subscriber private keys archived by the CA are stored in encrypted form using a cryptographic algorithm
and key length based on a risk assessment and the business requirements of the CA.

15

16
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that subscriber keys
escrowed by the CA remain confidential.

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

17

If the CA provides subscriber key archival, all archived subscriber keys are destroyed at the end of the
archive period.
Subscriber private keys escrowed by the CA are stored in encrypted form using a cryptographic algorithm
and key length based on a risk assessment and the business requirements of the CA.
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2.2 Certificate Life Cycle Controls
Note: A requesting entity may be a subscriber requesting a certificate from an RA or CA, an RA requesting
a certificate from a CA, or a Subordinate CA requesting a certificate from a Root CA or Superior CA.

2.2.1 Subscriber Registration

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that subscribers are
properly identified and authenticated.

1

The CA verifies or requires that the external RA verify the identity of the entity requesting a certificate as
disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 25).

2

The CA requires that an entity requesting a certificate must prepare and submit the appropriate certificate
request data (Registration Request) to an RA (or the CA) as disclosed in the CA’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 25).
The CA verifies or requires that the external RA verify the authority of the entity requesting a certificate as
disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 25).
The CA verifies or requires that the external RA verify the accuracy of the information included in the
requesting entity’s certificate request as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 25).
If external registration authorities are used, the CA validates the identity of external Registration
Authorities as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 26).
If external registration authorities are used, the CA authorizes external Registration Authorities as disclosed
in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 26).
The CA requires that an entity requesting a certificate prepare and submit the appropriate certificate request
data to the CA or an external RA as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 25).

3
4
5
6
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that subscriber
certificate requests are accurate, authorized, and
complete.

7

8

The CA requires that the requesting entity submit its public key in a signed message to the CA for
certification. The CA requires that the requesting entity digitally sign the Registration Request using the
private key that relates to the public key contained in the Registration Request in order to
a.

9
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Allow the detection of errors in the certificate application process.

b. Prove possession of the companion private key for the public key being registered.
The CA uses the public key contained in the requesting entity’s Certificate Request to verify the requesting
entity’s signature on the Certificate Request submission.

© 2000 AICPA / CICA
Page 55

Version 1.0

PRINCIPLE 2: Service Integrity - The Certification Authority maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
• Subscriber information was properly authenticated (for the registration activities performed by ABC-CA) and
• The integrity of keys and certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their life cycles.
CRITERIA
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(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

The CA accepts the Certificate Request from the requesting entity whose identity has been validated.

18

When the CA detects duplicate public keys, the Certificate Request is rejected and the original certificate is
revoked.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

The subscriber’s Certificate Renewal Request includes at least the subscriber’s distinguished name, the
serial number of the certificate (or other information that identifies the certificate), and the requested
validity period to allow the CA or the RA to identify the certificate to renew.

2

4

The CA requires that the requesting entity digitally sign the Certificate Renewal Request using the private
key that relates to the public key contained in the requesting entity’s existing public key certificate.
The CA or the RA processes the certificate renewal data to verify the identity of the requesting entity and
identify the certificate to be renewed.
The CA or the RA validates the signature on the Certificate Renewal Request.

5

The CA or the RA verifies the existence and validity of the certificate to be renewed.

6

The CA or the RA verifies that the request, including the extension of the validity period, meets the
requirements as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 28).

3
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If an external RA is used, the CA verifies the authenticity of the submission by the RA as disclosed in the
CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 26).
If an external RA is used, the CA verifies the RA’s signature on the Certificate Request.
The CA or RA checks the Certificate Request for errors or omissions as disclosed in the CA’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 25).
The CA verifies the uniqueness of the requesting entity’s distinguished name within the CA’s domain.

2.2.2 Certificate Renewal (Optional)
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that certificate renewal
requests are accurate, authorized, and complete.

If an external RA is used, the CA requires that external RAs submit the requesting entity’s certificate
request data to the CA in a message (Certificate Request) signed by the RA.
If an external RA is used, the CA requires that the RA secure that part of the certificate application process
for which it (the RA) assumes responsibility as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item
26).
If an external RA is used, the CA requires that external RAs record their actions in an event journal.
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ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)
7

9

If an external RA is used, the CA requires that external RAs submit the requesting entity’s certificate
request data to the CA in a message (Certificate Renewal Request) signed by the RA.
When an external RA is used, the RA secures that part of the certificate renewal process for which it (the
RA) assumes responsibility as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 26).
If an external RA is used, the CA requires that external RAs record their actions in an event journal.

10

If an external RA is used, the CA verifies the authenticity of the submission by the RA.

11

If an external RA is used, the CA verifies the RA’s signature on the Certificate Renewal Request.

12

The CA or RA checks the Certificate Renewal Request for errors or omissions.

13

The CA or RA notifies subscribers prior to the expiration of their certificate of the need for renewal as
disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 27).
Prior to certificate generation and issuance of renewed certificates, the CA or RA verifies the following:
a. The signature on the certificate renewal data submission

8

14

2.2.3 Certificate Rekey
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that certificate rekey
requests are accurate, authorized, and complete.

The existence and validity of the certificate to be renewed

c.

That the request, including the extension of the validity period, meets the requirements as
disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 27)

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

The subscriber’s Certificate Rekey Request includes at least the subscriber’s distinguished name, the serial
number of the certificate, and the requested validity period to allow the CA or the RA to identify the
certificate to rekey.

2

4

The CA requires that the requesting entity digitally sign the Certificate Rekey Request using the private key
that relates to the public key contained in the requesting entity’s existing public key certificate.
The CA or the RA processes the Certificate Rekey Request to verify the identity of the requesting entity
and identify the certificate to be rekeyed.
The CA or the RA validates the signature on the Certificate Rekey Request.

5

The CA or the RA verifies the existence and validity of the certificate to be rekeyed.

3
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b.
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ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)
6

9

The CA or the RA verifies that the Certificate Rekey Request meets the requirements as disclosed in the
CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 28).
If an external RA is used, the CA requires that external RAs submit the requesting entity’s certificate rekey
request to the CA in a message signed by the RA.
If an external RA is used, the CA requires that the RA secure that part of the certificate rekey process for
which it (the RA) assumes responsibility as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 26).
If an external RA is used, the CA requires that external RAs record their actions in an event journal.

10

If an external RA is used, the CA verifies the authenticity of the submission by the RA.

11

If an external RA is used, the CA verifies the RA’s signature on the Certificate Rekey Request.

12

The CA or the RA checks the Certificate Rekey Request for errors or omissions.

13

The CA or RA notifies subscribers prior to the expiration of their certificate of the need for rekey.

14

Prior to the generation and issuance of rekeyed certificates, the CA or RA verifies the following:
a. The signature on the certificate renewal data submission

7
8

b.

The existence and validity of the certificate to be renewed

c.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that certificate rekey
requests following certificate revocation or expiration
are accurate, authorized, and complete.
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15

That the request, including the extension of the validity period, meets the requirements as
disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 28)
Following the revocation or expiration of a subscriber’s existing certificate, the subscriber is required to
follow the CA’s subscriber registration procedures to obtain a new rekeyed certificate (as specified in
§2.2.1, Subscriber Registration) as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 29).
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2.2.4 Certificate Issuance
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that new, renewed, and
rekeyed certificates are generated and issued in
accordance with the CA’s disclosed business
practices.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

The CA generates certificates using the appropriate certificate format as disclosed in the CA’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 30).

2

The CA generates certificates in accordance with ISO 9594/X.509 as disclosed in the CA’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 30).
Validity periods are set in accordance with ISO 9594/X.509 as disclosed in the CA’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 30).
Extension fields are set in accordance with ISO 9594/X.509 as disclosed in the CA’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 30).
Key usage extension fields are set in accordance with ISO 9594/X.509 as disclosed in the CA’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 30).
The CA signs the requesting entity’s certificate with the CA’s private signing key.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
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The CA issues the certificate after the certificate has been accepted by the requesting entity as disclosed in
the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 31).
When an RA is used, the CA notifies the RA when a certificate is issued to a subscriber for whom the RA
submitted a certificate request.
For certificate renewals, the CA generates and signs a new instance of the certificate, differing from the
previous certificate only by the validity period and the CA signature only if the CA has approved the
certificate renewal request as specified in §2.2.2 Certificate Renewal.
For rekeyed certificates, the CA generates and signs a new certificate only if the CA has approved the
certificate rekey request as specified in §2.2.3 Certificate Rekey.
The CA issues an out-of-band notification to the requesting entity when a certificate is issued.
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2.2.5 Certificate Distribution
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that, upon issuance,
complete and accurate certificates are available to
subscribers and relying parties in accordance with the
CA's disclosed business practices.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

The CA makes the certificates issued by the CA available to relying parties using an established
mechanism (for example, a repository such as a directory) as disclosed in the CA’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 32).

2
3

Upon certificate issuance, the CA posts certificates to the repository or alternative distribution mechanism
as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 32).
Only authorized CA personnel may administer the CA’s repository or alternative distribution mechanism.

4

The performance of the CA’s repository or alternative distribution mechanism is monitored and managed.

5

The integrity of the repository or alternative distribution mechanism is maintained.

2.2.6 Certificate Revocation
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that certificates are
revoked based on authorized and validated certificate
revocation requests.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

2
3

4
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As disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 33), the CA provides a means of rapid
communication to facilitate the secure and authenticated revocation of the following:
a.

One or more certificates of one or more entities

b.

The set of all certificates issued by a CA based on a single public/private key pair used by a
CA to generate certificates

c. All certificates issued by a CA, regardless of the public/private key pair used
The CA verifies or requires that the external RA verify the identity and authority of the entity requesting
revocation of a certificate as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 33).
If an external RA accepts revocation requests, the CA requires that the RA submit certificate revocation
requests to the CA in an authenticated manner as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item
33).
If an external RA accepts and forwards revocation requests to the CA, the CA provides an authenticated
acknowledgement of the revocation to the requesting RA as disclosed in the CA’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 33).
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5
6
7
8

2.2.7 Certificate Suspension (Optional)
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that certificates are
suspended based on authorized and validated
certificate suspension requests.

The CA or RA provides an authenticated acknowledgement of the revocation to the entity whose certificate
has been revoked as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 33).
Where certificate renewal is supported, when a certificate is revoked, all valid instances of the certificate
are also revoked.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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The CA updates the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and other certificate status mechanisms upon
certificate revocation as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 33).
The CA records all certificate revocation requests and their outcome in an event journal.

As disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 34), the CA provides a means of rapid
communication are in place to facilitate the secure and authenticated suspension of the following:
a.

One or more certificates of one or more entities

b.

The set of all certificates issued by a CA based on a single public/private key pair used by a
CA to generate certificates

c. All certificates issued by a CA, regardless of the public/private key pair used
The CA verifies or requires that the external RA verify the identity and authority of the entity requesting
suspension of a certificate as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 34).
If an external RA accepts suspension requests, the RA submits certificate suspension requests to the CA in
an authenticated manner as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 34).
The CA or RA notifies the End Entity in the event of a certificate suspension as disclosed in the CA’s
business practices (Principle 1, item 34).
Certificate suspension requests are processed and validated as disclosed in the CA’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 34).
The CA updates the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and other certificate status mechanisms upon
certificate suspension as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 34).
Certificates are suspended only for the allowable length of time as disclosed in the CA’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 34).
Once a certificate suspension (hold) has been issued, the suspension is handled in one of the following
three ways:
a. An entry for the suspended certificate remains on the CRL with no further action, causing
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users to reject transactions issued during the hold period
b.

9
10
11
12

2.2.8 Certificate Status Information Processing
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that timely, complete
and accurate certificate status information (including
Certificate Revocation Lists and other certificate
status mechanisms) is made available to subscribers
and relying parties.

c. The suspended certificate is explicitly released and the entry removed from the CRL
A certificate suspension (hold) entry remains on the CRL until the expiration of the underlying certificate
or the expiration of the suspension, whichever is first.
The CA updates the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and other certificate status mechanisms upon the
lifting of a certificate suspension as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 34).
The CA verifies or requires that the external RA verify the identity and authority of the entity requesting
that the suspension of a certificate be lifted.
Certificate suspensions and the lifting of certificate suspensions are recorded in an event journal.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

Certificate status information is made available to all relevant entities as disclosed in the CA’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 35).

2

The CA makes each Certificate Revocation List (CRL) issued by the CA available to relying parties using
an established mechanism (for example, a repository such as a directory) as disclosed in the CAs business
practices (Principle 1, item 35).
The CA digitally signs each CRL that it issues so that entities can validate the integrity of the CRL and the
date of issuance.
The CA issues CRLs at regular intervals, even if no changes have occurred since the last issuance, as
disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 35).
At a minimum, a CRL entry identifying a revoked certificate remains on the CRL until the end of the
certificate’s validity period.
If certificate suspension is supported, a certificate suspension (hold) entry, with its original action date and
expiration date remains on the CRL until the normal expiration of the certificate.

3
4
5
6
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The CRL entry for the suspended certificate is replaced by a revocation entry for the same
certificate
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7

CRLs are archived as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 35).

8

CAs include a monotonically increasing sequence number for each CRL issued by that CA (for example, 1,
2, 3).
The CRL contains entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CA.

9
10
11
12

13

Old CRLs are retained for the appropriate period of time as disclosed in the CA’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 35).
Whether certificates expire, are revoked or are suspended, copies of certificates are retained for the
appropriate period of time as disclosed in the CA’s disclosed business practices (Principle 1, item 35).
If an online certificate status mechanism (for example, OCSP) is used, the CA requires that certificate
status inquiries (for example, OCSP requests) contain all required data as disclosed in the CA's business
practices (Principle 1, item 35).
Upon the receipt of a certificate status request (for example, an OCSP request) from a relying party, the CA
returns a definitive response to the relying party if:
a. the request message is well formed
b.

the responder is configured to provide the requested service and

c.

14
15
16
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the request contains the information needed by the responder as disclosed in the CA's
business practices (Principle 1, item 35).
All definitive response messages are digitally signed as disclosed in the CA's business practices (Principle
1, item 35).
Definitive response messages include all required data as disclosed in the CA's business practices
(Principle 1, item 35).
If any of the three conditions (specified in item 13) are not met, the CA produces a signed or unsigned error
message as disclosed in the CA's business practices (Principle 1, item 35).
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2.2.9

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)
Note: For purposes of this section, integrated circuit cards (e.g., smart cards) include devices that may
hold a Subscriber’s private key(s) and certificate(s).

Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) Life Cycle

Management (Optional)

Such controls generally include but are not limited to, the following:
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that ICC preparation is
securely controlled by the CA (or RA).

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that ICC Application
Data File (ADF) preparation is securely controlled by
the CA (or RA).

1

The CA (or RA), as the card issuer, controls ICC personalization (the loading of Common Data File (CDF)
data and its related cryptographic keys).

2

3

Common data that identify the ICC, the card issuer, and the cardholder are stored by the card issuer in the
ICC Common Data File (CDF). Common Data File (CDF) activation is performed by the CA (or RA), as
the card issuer, using a securely controlled process.
After CDF activation, the ICC indicates a CDF activated status.

4

The CA (or RA) logs ICC personalization and CDF activation.

5

Specific application supplier data stored in the ICC is located in the application data file (ADF).
Application Data File (ADF) allocation (the allocation of memory areas in an integrated circuit) is securely
controlled by the CA, as the card issuer.

6

8

The CA, as the application supplier, controls ADF personalization (the loading of ADF related keys and
data).
The CA, as the card issuer, controls ADF activation (preparation of an ADF for use by the cardholder)
using a securely controlled process.
An ADF can only be activated when the CDF is either in an activated or a reactivated state.

9

After ADF activation, the ICC indicates an ADF activated status.

10

The CA logs ADF allocation, personalization, and activation.

11

An ICC is not issued unless the card has been personalized.

12

An ICC is unusable unless the CDF is in an activated or a reactivated state.

7

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that ICC usage is
enabled by the CA (or RA) prior to ICC issuance.

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that ICCs are securely
stored and distributed by the CA (or RA).

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that ICC deactivation
and reactivation are securely controlled by the CA (or
RA).

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the use of ICCs is
securely terminated for ICCs returned to the CA (or
RA).

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)
13

ICCs are securely stored prior to distribution.

14
15

Receipt, activation, and distribution of ICCs are logged in an event journal. An inventory of ICCs and their
status is maintained.
ICCs are securely distributed as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 38).

16

Application Data File (ADF) deactivation can be performed only by the CA, as the application supplier.

17

Common Data File (CDF) deactivation can be performed only by the CA, as the card issuer.

18

CDF reactivation is conducted under the control of the CA, as the card issuer.

19

ADF reactivation is conducted under the control of the CA, as the application supplier.

20

ADF deactivation, CDF deactivation, CDF reactivation, and ADF reactivation are logged.

21

The CA, as the application supplier, controls ADF termination.

22

Common Data File (CDF) termination is controlled by the CA, as the card issuer.
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ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
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3.1 Certification Practice Statement and
Certificate Policy Management
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the CA’s CPS and
Certificate Policy (CP) management controls are
effective.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

The CA organization has a management group with final authority and responsibility for specifying and
approving the CA’s Certification Practice Statement (CPS).

2

There is a Policy Management Authority with final authority and responsibility for specifying and
approving Certificate Policy(s).
The Policy Management Authority (or equivalent group) has performed an assessment to evaluate business
risks and determine the security requirements and operational procedures to be included in the applicable
Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement for the following:
a. Key life cycle management controls

3

b.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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Certificate life cycle management controls

c. CA environmental controls
The CA’s CPS is approved and modified in accordance with a defined review process, including
responsibilities for maintaining the CPS.
The CA makes available its public Certification Practice Statement (CPS) to all appropriate subscribers and
relying parties.
Revisions to the CA’s CPS are made available to subscribers and relying parties.
Certificate Policy(s) are approved and modified in accordance with a defined review process, including
responsibilities for maintaining the Certificate Policy(s).
A defined review process exists to ensure that Certificate Policy(s) are supported by the CA’s CPS.
The CA makes available the Certificate Policies supported by the CA to all appropriate subscribers and
relying parties.
Revisions to Certificate Policy(s) supported by the CA are made available to subscribers and relying
parties.
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3.2 Security Management
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that management
direction and support for information security is
provided.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

An information security policy document (security policy) is approved by management, published, and
communicated, as appropriate, to all employees.

2

The security policy contains a definition of information security, its overall objectives and scope, and the
importance of security as an enabling mechanism for information sharing.
The security policy contains a statement of management intent, supporting the goals and principles of
information security.
The security policy contains an explanation of the security policies, principles, standards, and compliance
requirements of particular importance to the organization, including the following:
a. Compliance with legislative and contractual requirements

3
4

5
6
7
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that information
security is properly managed within the organization.

8

9
10

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

b.

Security education requirements

c.

Prevention and detection of viruses and other malicious software

d.

Business continuity management

e. The consequences of security policy violations
The security policy contains a definition of general and specific responsibilities for information security
management, including reporting security incidents.
The security policy contains references to documentation which supports the policy.
There is a defined review process, including responsibilities and review dates, for maintaining the security
policy.
Senior management and/or a high level management information security committee ensures there is clear
direction and visible management support for security initiatives.
A management group or security committee exists to coordinate the implementation of information security
measures.
Responsibilities for the protection of individual assets and for carrying out specific security processes are
clearly defined.
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The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the security of CA
facilities, systems, and information assets accessed by
third parties is maintained.

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)
11

A management authorization process for new information processing facilities exists and is followed.

12

Procedures exist and are followed to control physical and logical access to CA facilities and systems by
third parties including on-site contractors and trading partners or joint ventures.

13

If there is a business need for the CA to allow third-party access to CA facilities and systems, a risk
assessment is performed to determine security implications and specific control requirements.
Arrangements involving third-party access to CA facilities and systems are based on a formal contract
containing all necessary security requirements.
If the CA outsources the management and control of all or some of its information systems, networks,
and/or desktop environments, the security requirements of the CA are addressed in a contract agreed
between the parties.

14
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the security of
information is maintained when the responsibility for
CA functions has been outsourced to another
organization or entity.

15

16

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

A Certification Authority (CA) service provider may choose to delegate a portion of the Certification
Authority roles and respective functions, and the CA service provider is ultimately responsible for the
completion of the identified functions that it performs and the definition and maintenance of a statement of
its certification practices (meaning, CPS).
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ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
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3.3 Asset Classification and Management
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA assets and
information receive an appropriate level of protection.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

Owners are identified for all major CA assets and assigned responsibility for the maintenance of
appropriate controls.

2

Inventories of important CA assets are maintained.

3

The CA has implemented information classification and associated protective controls for information that
take account of business needs for sharing or restricting information, and the business impacts associated
with such needs.
Procedures are defined to ensure that information labeling and handling is performed in accordance with
the CA’s information classification scheme.

4

3.4 Personnel Security
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that personnel and
hiring practices enhance and support the
trustworthiness of the CA’s operations.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

Security roles and responsibilities, as specified in the organization’s security policy, are documented in job
descriptions.

2

Verification checks on permanent staff are performed at the time of job application. The CA’s policies and
procedures specify the background checks and clearance procedures required for the personnel filling the
trusted roles, and other personnel, including janitorial staff.
Employees sign a confidentiality (nondisclosure) agreement as part of their initial terms and conditions of
employment.
Contracting personnel controls include the following:
a. Bonding requirements on contract personnel

3
4
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b.

Contractual requirements including indemnification for damages due to the actions of the
contractor personnel

c.

Audit and monitoring of contractor personnel
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5

6
7

8

3.5 Physical and Environmental Security
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that physical access to
CA facilities is limited to properly authorized
individuals and CA facilities are protected from
environmental hazards.

b. Any retraining period and retraining procedures for each role
Periodic reviews occur to verify the continued trustworthiness of personnel involved in the activities
related to related to key management and certificate management.
A formal disciplinary process exists and is followed for employees who have violated organizational
security policies and procedures. The CA’s policies and procedures specify the sanctions against personnel
for unauthorized actions, unauthorized use of authority, and unauthorized use of systems.
Appropriate and timely actions are taken when an employee is terminated so that controls and security are
not impaired by such an occurrence.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

Physical protection is achieved through the creation of clearly defined security perimeters (meaning,
physical barriers) around the business premises and CA facilities.

2

The perimeter of the building or site containing the CA facility is physically sound (meaning, there should
be no gaps in the perimeter where a break-in could easily occur).
A manned reception area or other means to control physical access is in place to restrict access to the
building or site housing CA operations to authorized personnel only.
To prevent unauthorized entry and environmental contamination, proper physical barriers are in place (for
example, extended from real floor to real ceiling as opposed to raised floor to suspended ceiling) as
disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 43).
All fire doors on security perimeters around the CA facilities are alarmed and slam shut.

3
4

5
6
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All employees of the organization and, where relevant, third-party users, receive appropriate training in
organizational policies and procedures. The CA’s policies and procedures specify the following:
a. The training requirements and training procedures for each role

Intruder detection systems are installed and regularly tested to cover all external doors of the building
housing the CA facility and the CA facility itself.
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ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
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7

The CA facility is alarmed when unoccupied.

8

The CA facility is physically locked and periodically checked when vacant.

9

Unsupervised working in secure CA facilities is not allowed both for safety reasons and to prevent
opportunities for malicious activities.
All personnel are required to wear visible identification and are encouraged to challenge anyone not
wearing visible identification.
Access to CA facilities is controlled and restricted to authorized persons only through the use of
authentication controls as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 43).
All personnel entering and leaving the CA facility are logged (meaning, an audit trail of all access is
securely maintained).
Visitors to the CA facility are supervised and their date and time of entry and departure recorded.

10
11
12
13
14
15
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that loss, damage, or
compromise of assets and interruption to business
activities are prevented.

16

Equipment is sited or protected such as to reduce the risks from environmental threats and hazards, and
opportunities for unauthorized access.

17

Equipment is protected from power failures and other electrical anomalies.

18

Power and telecommunications cabling carrying data or supporting CA services is protected from
interception or damage.
Equipment is maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and/or other documented
procedures to ensure its continued availability and integrity.
All items of equipment containing storage media (meaning, fixed hard disks) are checked to determine
whether they contain any sensitive data prior to disposal or reuse. Storage devices containing sensitive
information are physically destroyed or securely overwritten prior to disposal or reuse.

19
20
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Third party support services personnel are granted restricted access to secure CA facilities only when
required and such access is authorized and monitored.
Access rights to the CA facility are regularly reviewed and updated.
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The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that compromise or
theft of information and information processing
facilities are prevented.

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)
21

Sensitive or critical business information is locked away when not required and when the CA facility is
vacated.

22

Personal computers and workstations are not left logged on when unattended and are protected by key
locks, passwords, or other controls when not in use.
Equipment, information, and software belonging to the organization cannot be taken off-site without
authorization.

23

3.6 Operations Management
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the correct and
secure operation of CA information processing
facilities is ensured.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

CA operating procedures are documented and maintained.

2

Formal management responsibilities and procedures exist to control all changes to CA equipment,
software, and operating procedures.
Duties and areas of responsibility are segregated in order to reduce opportunities for unauthorized
modification or misuse of information or services.
Development and testing facilities are separated from operational facilities.

3
4
5
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the risk of CA
systems failure is minimized.

6

7
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Prior to using external facilities management services, risks are identified, and appropriate controls are
agreed upon with the contractor and incorporated into the contract.
Capacity demands are monitored and projections of future capacity requirements made to ensure that
adequate processing power and storage are available.
Acceptance criteria for new information systems, upgrades and new versions are established and suitable
tests of the system carried out prior to acceptance.
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The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of CA
systems and information is protected against viruses
and malicious software.

8

Detection and prevention controls to protect against viruses and malicious software and appropriate user
awareness procedures are implemented.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that damage from
security incidents and malfunctions is minimized
through the use of incident reporting and response
procedures.

9

A formal reporting procedure exists and is followed, together with an incident response procedure, setting
out the action to be taken on receipt of an incident report.

10
11

Users of CA systems are required to note and report observed or suspected security weaknesses in or
threats to systems or services.
Procedures exist and are followed for reporting software malfunctions.

12

Procedures exist and are followed to ensure that faults are reported and corrective action is taken.

13

The types, volumes, and costs of incidents and malfunctions are quantified and monitored.

14

Incident management responsibilities and procedures exist and are followed to ensure a quick, effective,
and orderly response to security incidents.
Procedures for the management of removable computer media require the following.
a. If no longer required, the previous contents of any re-usable media that are to be removed
from the organization are erased.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that media are securely
handled to protect media from damage, theft, and
unauthorized access.

15

b.

Authorization is required for all media removed from the organization and a record of all such
removals to maintain an audit trail is kept.

c.

16
17
18
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All media are stored in a safe, secure environment, in accordance with manufacturers’
specifications.
Media is disposed of securely and safely when no longer required.
Procedures for the handling and storage of information exist and are followed in order to protect such
information from unauthorized disclosure or misuse.
System documentation is protected from unauthorized access.
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3.7 System Access Management

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA system access
is limited to properly authorized individuals.

User access management

1

Business requirements for access control are defined and documented in an access control policy which
includes at least the following:
a. Roles and corresponding access permissions
b.

Identification and authentication process for each user

c.

Segregation of duties

3

d. Number of persons required to perform specific CA operations (meaning, m of n rule)
A formal user registration and deregistration procedure for granting access to CA information systems and
services is followed.
The allocation and use of privileges is restricted and controlled.

4

The allocation of passwords is controlled through a formal management process.

5

Users’ access rights are reviewed at regular intervals.

6

Users are required to follow defined policies and procedures in the selection and use of passwords.

7

Users are required to ensure that unattended equipment has appropriate protection.

2

Network access control

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

8

Users are provided direct access only to the services that they have been specifically authorized to use.

9

The path from the user terminal to computer services is controlled.

10

If permitted, access by remote users is subject to authentication.

11

Connections to remote computer systems are authenticated.

12

Access to diagnostic ports is securely controlled.
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13
14
15
16

Controls (for example, firewalls) are in place to protect the CA’s internal network domains from external
network domains accessible by third parties.
Controls are in place to limit the services (for example, HTTP, FTP) available to users in accordance with
the CA’s access control policies.
Routing controls are in place to ensure that computer connections and information flows do not breach the
access control policy of the organization’s business applications.
The security attributes of all network services used by the organization are documented by the CA.
Operating system access control

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Automatic terminal identification is used to authenticate connections to specific locations and to portable
equipment.
Access to CA systems uses a secure logon process.
All users have a unique identifier (user ID) for their personal and sole use so that activities can be traced to
the responsible individual.
A password management system is in place to provide an effective, interactive facility which ensures
quality passwords.
Use of system utility programs are restricted and tightly controlled.
If required based on a risk assessment, duress alarms are provided for users who might be the target of
coercion.
Inactive terminals serving CA systems timeout after a defined period of inactivity to prevent access by
unauthorized persons.
Restrictions on connection times are used to provide additional security for high-risk applications.
Application access control

25
26
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Access to information and application system functions are restricted in accordance with the access control
policy.
Sensitive systems require a dedicated (isolated) computing environment.
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3.8 Systems Development and Maintenance
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that CA systems
development and maintenance activities are properly
authorized to maintain CA system integrity.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

Business requirements for new systems or enhancements to existing systems specify the requirements for
controls.

2
3

Change control procedures exist and are followed for the implementation of software on operational
systems.
Change control procedures exist and are followed for scheduled software releases and modifications.

4

Change control procedures exist and are followed for emergency software fixes.

5

Test data is protected and controlled.

6

Strict control is maintained over access to program source libraries.

7
8

The implementation of changes is strictly controlled by the use of formal change control procedures to
minimize the risk of corruption of information systems.
Application systems are reviewed and tested when operating system changes occur.

9

Modifications to software packages are discouraged and essential changes strictly controlled.

10

The purchase, use, and modification of software is controlled and checked to protect against possible
covert channels and Trojan code.
Controls are in place to secure outsourced software development.

11

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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3.9 Business Continuity Management
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance of continuity of
operations in the event of a disaster.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

The CA has a managed process for developing and maintaining its business continuity plans.

2

The CA has a business continuity planning strategy based on an appropriate risk assessment.

3

The CA has business continuity plans to maintain or restore the CA’s business operations in a timely
manner following interruption to, or failure of, critical business processes as disclosed in the CA’s business
practices (Principle 1, item 44).
The CA has a business continuity planning framework which requires that business continuity plans
address the following:
a. The conditions for activating the plans

4

5
6
7
8

9
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b.

Emergency procedures

c.

Fallback procedures

d.

Resumption procedures

e.

A maintenance schedule

f.

Awareness and education requirements

g. The responsibilities of the individuals
Business continuity plans are tested regularly to ensure that they are up-to-date and effective.
Business continuity plans are maintained by regular reviews and updates to ensure their continuing
effectiveness.
Business continuity plans define an acceptable system outage time, recovery time, and the average time
between failures as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 44).
The CA’s business continuity plans include disaster recovery processes for all critical components of a CA
system, including the hardware, software, and keys, in the event of a failure of one or more of these
components.
The CA’s business continuity plans address the recovery procedures used if computing resources, software,
and/or data are corrupted or suspected to be corrupted.
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10

11

12
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance of continuity of
operations in the event of the compromise of the CA’s
private signing key.

13

14

15

16

The CA’s business continuity plans include procedures for securing its facility during the period of time
following a natural or other disaster and before a secure environment is reestablished either at the original
site or a remote hot site.
Back-up copies of essential business information and software are regularly taken as disclosed in the CA’s
business practices (Principle 1, item 44). The security requirements of these copies are consistent with the
controls for the information backed up.
Fallback equipment and back-up media are sited at a safe distance to avoid damage from disaster at the
main site as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 44).
The CA’s business continuity plans address the compromise or suspected compromise of a CA’s private
signing key as a disaster.

In the event of the compromise or suspected compromise of a CA’s private key, disaster recovery
procedures include the revocation and reissuance of all certificates that were signed with the CA’s private
key.
The recovery procedures used if the CA’s private key is compromised and the CA’s public key is revoked
include the following:
a. How a secure environment is reestablished
b.

How the CA’s old public key is revoked

c.

How the CA’s new public key is provided to the users

d. How the subjects are recertified
In the event that the CA has to replace its CA Root private key, procedures are in place for the secure and
authenticated revocation of the following:
a. The old CA root public key
b.

17
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The set of all certificates issued by a CA based on the compromised private key

c. Any subordinate CA private keys and corresponding certificates
The CA’s business continuity plan for key compromise addresses who is notified and what actions are
taken with system software and hardware, symmetric and asymmetric keys, previously generated
signatures, and encrypted data.
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18

3.10 Monitoring and Compliance
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the CA complies
with legal requirements.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

All relevant statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements are explicitly defined and documented for
each information system.

2

3

Appropriate procedures are implemented to ensure compliance with legal restrictions on the use of material
in respect of intellectual property rights, and on the use of proprietary software products as disclosed in the
CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 42).
Important records of an organization are protected from loss, destruction, and falsification.

4

Controls are applied to protect personal information in accordance with relevant legislation.

5

Management authorizes the use of information processing facilities and controls are applied to prevent the
misuse of such facilities.
Controls are in place to ensure compliance with national agreements, laws, regulations, or other
instruments to control the access to or use of cryptographic controls.
As disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 41), the CA’s confidentiality policies and
procedures address the following:
a. The kinds of information that must be kept confidential by CA or RA

6
7
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The CA maintains procedures for the termination, notification of affected entities, and for transferring
relevant archived CA records to a custodian as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item
40).

b.

The kinds of information that are not considered confidential

c.

Who is entitled to be informed of reasons for revocation and suspension of certificates

d.

The policy on release of information to law enforcement officials

e.

Information that can be revealed as part of civil discovery
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f.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that compliance with
the CA’s security policies and procedures is ensured.

8

9
10
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the effectiveness of
the system audit process is maximized and
interference to and from the system audit process is
minimized.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that unauthorized CA
system usage is detected.

g. Any other circumstances under which confidential information may be disclosed
Managers are responsible for ensuring that security procedures within their area of responsibility are
carried out correctly.
The CA’s operations are subject to regular review to ensure compliance with security policies and
standards.
CA systems are periodically checked for compliance with security implementation standards.

11

Audits of operational systems are planned and agreed such as to minimize the risk of disruptions to
business processes.

12

Access to system audit tools is protected to prevent possible misuse or compromise.

13

Procedures for monitoring the use of CA systems are established and the results of the monitoring activities
are reviewed regularly.

3.11 Event Journaling
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that significant CA
environmental, key management, and certificate
management events are accurately and completely
logged.

Such controls generally include but are not limited to the following:
1

The CA generates automatic (electronic) and manual event journals as appropriate.

2

All journal entries include the following elements:
a.
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The conditions upon which CA or RA may disclose information upon the owner’s request;
and

Date and time of the entry
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3

b.

Serial or sequence number of entry (for automatic journal entries)

c.

Kind of entry

d.

Source of entry (for example, terminal, port, location, customer)

e. Identity of the entity making the journal entry
The CA logs the following key life cycle management related events:
a.

CA (and subscriber, if applicable) key generation

b.

Installation of manual cryptographic keys and its outcome (with the identity of the operator)

c.

CA (and subscriber, if applicable) key backup

d.

CA (and subscriber, if applicable) key storage

e.

CA (and subscriber, if applicable) key recovery

f.

CA (and subscriber, if applicable) key escrow activities (optional)

g.

CA key usage

h.

CA (and subscriber, if applicable) key archival

i.

Withdrawal of keying material from service

j.

CA (and subscriber, if applicable) key destruction

k.

Identity of the entity authorizing a key management operation

l.

Identity of the entity handling any keying material (such as key components or keys stored in
portable devices or media)

m. Custody of keys and of devices or media holding keys
4
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n. Compromise of a private key
The CA logs the following certificate life cycle management related events:
a.

Receipt of requests for certificate(s)– including initial certificate requests, renewal requests
and rekey requests

b.

Submissions of public keys for certification

c.

Change of affiliation of an entity
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5

6

7
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d.

Generation of certificates

e.

Distribution of the CA’s public key

f.

Certificate revocation requests

g.

Certificate suspension requests (if applicable)

h.

Generation and issuance of Certificate Revocation Lists

i. Actions taken upon expiration of a certificate
The CA logs the following cryptographic device life cycle management related events:
a.

Device receipt

b.

Entering or removing a device from storage

c.

Device usage

d.

Device deinstallation

e.

Designation of a device for service and repair

f. Device retirement
The CA logs (or requires that the RA log) the following certificate application information:
a.

Kind of identification document(s) presented by the applicant

b.

Record of unique identification data, numbers, or a combination thereof (for example,
applicant’s drivers license number) of identification documents, if applicable

c.

Storage location of copies of applications and identification documents

d.

Identity of entity accepting the application

e.

Method used to validate identification documents, if any

f. Name of receiving CA or submitting RA, if applicable
The CA logs the following security sensitive events:
a.

Security sensitive files or records read or written, including the event journal

b.

Deletion of security sensitive data
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The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that the confidentiality
and integrity of current and archived event journals
are maintained.

The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that event journals are
completely and confidentially archived in accordance
with disclosed business practices.

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLS
(based on the CA control procedures detailed in the draft ANSI X9.79 standard)
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Security profile changes

d.

Use of identification and authentication mechanisms, both successful and unsuccessful
(including multiple failed authentication)

e.

System crashes, hardware failures and other anomalies

f.

Actions taken by computer operators and system administrators and/or system security
officers

g.

Change of affiliation of an entity

h.

Decisions to bypass encryption/authentication processes or procedures

8

i. Access to the CA system or any component thereof
Event journals do not record the plain text values of any private keys.

9

CA computer system clocks are synchronized for accurate recording.

10

Current and archived event journals are maintained in a form that prevents unauthorized modification or
destruction.

11

Current and archived automated event journals are protected from modification or substitution.

12

The private key used for signing event journals is not used for any other purpose.

13

The CA archives event journal data on a periodic basis as disclosed in the CA’s business practices
(Principle 1, item 45).

14

A risk assessment has been performed to determine the appropriate length of time for retention of archived
event journals.
The CA maintains archived event journals at a secure off-site location for a predetermined period.

15
The Certification Authority maintains controls to
provide reasonable assurance that event journals are

c.

16

Current and archived event journals may only be retrieved by authorized individuals for valid business or
security reasons.
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reviewed periodically by authorized personnel.
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17

Event journals are reviewed periodically as disclosed in the CA’s business practices (Principle 1, item 45).

18

The review of current and archived event journals includes a validation of the event journals’ integrity, and
the identification and follow-up of exceptional, unauthorized, or suspicious activity.
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Appendix A - Illustrative Examples of Practitioner Reports

This appendix presents six illustrative reports for WebTrust for Certification Authorities
engagements.

Illustrations 1-3 are prepared in accordance with the American Institute of

Certified Public Accounts’ (AICPA’s) attestation standards. Illustrations 4-6 are prepared in
accordance with the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants’ (CICA’s) assurance standards.
Both attest and direct engagements and reporting are supported in Canada. The practitioner’s
communication will vary depending on whether the assurance engagement is an attest
engagement or a direct reporting engagement.

In an attest engagement, the practitioner’s

conclusion will be on a written assertion prepared by the accountable party. The assertion
evaluates, using suitable criteria, the subject matter for which the accountable party is
responsible.

In a direct reporting engagement, the practitioner’s conclusion will evaluate

directly, using suitable criteria, the subject matter for which the accountable party is responsible.

Under the U. S. Attestation Standards, the first paragraph of the practitioner’s report will state
that the practitioner has performed an examination of management’s assertion about disclosures
of its business practices and effectiveness of its controls in conformity with the WebTrust
Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities.

The practitioner may opine (1) on

management’s assertion or (2) directly on the subject matter. Samples of both kinds of reports
have been provided.

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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Illustration No. 1 for Use in the United States
(Example where all criteria are applicable)
Report of Independent Certified Public Accountant
To the Management of
ABC Certification Authority, Inc.:
We have examined the assertion by the management of ABC Certification Authority, Inc. (ABC-CA) [hot
link to management’s assertion] that in providing its Certification Authority (CA) services at
LOCATION, ABC-CA, during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices [hot link to CA Business Practices Disclosure] and provided such
services in accordance with its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber information was properly authenticated (for the registration activities
performed by ABC-CA) and
- The integrity of keys and certificates it managed was established and protected
throughout their life cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber and relying party information was restricted to authorized individuals
and protected from uses not specified in the CA's business practices disclosure;
- The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations was
maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly authorized
and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

based on the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to WebTrust for
Certification Authorities Criteria].
ABC-CA’s management is responsible for its assertion. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on
management’s assertion based on our examination.
Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and accordingly, included (1) obtaining an understanding of
ABC-CA’s key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy practices and its
controls over key and certificate integrity, over the authenticity and privacy of subscriber and relying
party information, over the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations, and over
development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity; (2) selectively testing transactions executed
in accordance with disclosed key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy
practices; (3) testing and evaluating the operating effectiveness of the controls; and (4) performing such
other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our examination
provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, for the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000, ABC-CA management’s assertion,
WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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as set forth in the first paragraph, is fairly stated, in all material respects, based on the AICPA/CICA
WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria.
Because of inherent limitations in controls, errors or fraud may occur and not be detected. Furthermore,
the projection of any conclusions, based on our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1)
changes made to the system or controls, (2) changes in processing requirements, (3) changes required
because of the passage of time, or (4) degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may alter the
validity of such conclusions.
The WebTrust seal of assurance for Certification Authorities on ABC-CA’s Web site constitutes a
symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to
update this report or provide any additional assurance.
The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ABC-CA and their effect on
assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the
controls, and other factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have
performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying
party locations.
This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ABC-CA's services beyond those
covered by the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria, nor the suitability of any of ABC-CA's
services for any customer's intended purpose

[Name of CPA firm]
Certified Public Accountants
[City, State]
[Date]

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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Illustration No. 2 for Use in the United States
(Example where external RAs are used, the CA does not support key escrow,
certificate renewal, certificate suspension, the use of integrated circuit cards, or
the provision of subscriber key management services)
Report of Independent Certified Public Accountant
To the Management of
ABC Certification Authority, Inc.:
We have examined the assertion by the management of ABC Certification Authority, Inc. (ABC-CA) [hot
link to management’s assertion] that in providing its Certification Authority (CA) services at
LOCATION, ABC-CA during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices [hot link to CA Business Practices Disclosure] and provided such
services in accordance with its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber information was properly authenticated (for the registration activities
performed by ABC-CA) and
- The integrity of keys and certificates it managed was established and protected
throughout their life cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber and relying party information was restricted to authorized individuals
and protected from uses not specified in the CA's business practices disclosure;
- the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations was
maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly authorized
and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

based on the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to WebTrust for
Certification Authorities Criteria].
ABC-CA’s management is responsible for its assertion. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on
management’s assertion based on our examination.
ABC-CA makes use of external registration authorities for specific subscriber registration activities as
disclosed in ABC-CA’s business practice disclosures. Our examination did not extend to the controls of
external registration authorities.
Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and accordingly, included (1) obtaining an understanding of
ABC-CA’s key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy practices and its
controls over key and certificate integrity, over the continuity of key and certificate life cycle
management operations, over the authenticity and privacy of subscriber and relying party information and
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over development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity; (2) selectively testing transactions
executed in accordance with disclosed key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices; (3) testing and evaluating the operating effectiveness of the controls; and (4)
performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our
examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, for the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000, ABC-CA management’s assertion,
as set forth in the first paragraph, is fairly stated, in all material respects, based on the AICPA/CICA
WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria.
Because of inherent limitations in controls, errors or fraud may occur and not be detected. Furthermore,
the projection of any conclusions, based on our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1)
changes made to the system or controls, (2) changes in processing requirements, (3) changes required
because of the passage of time, or (4) degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may alter the
validity of such conclusions.
The WebTrust seal of assurance for Certification Authorities on ABC-CA’s Web site constitutes a
symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to
update this report or provide any additional assurance.
The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ABC-CA and their effect on
assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the
controls, and other factors present at external registration authorities and individual subscriber and relying
party locations. We have performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at external
registration authorities and individual subscriber and relying party locations.
This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ABC-CA's services beyond those
covered by the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria, nor the suitability of any of ABC-CA's
services for any customer's intended purpose

[Name of CPA firm]
Certified Public Accountants
[City, State]
[Date]
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Illustration No. 3 for Use in the United States
(Example where all criteria are applicable)
Report of Independent Certified Public Accountant
– Direct Report
To the Management of
ABC Certification Authority, Inc.:
We have examined the assertion [hot link to management’s assertion] by the management of ABC
Certification Authority, Inc. (ABC-CA) regarding the disclosure of its key and certificate life cycle
management business and information privacy practices on its Web site and the effectiveness of its
controls over key and certificate integrity, over the authenticity and privacy of subscriber and relying
party information, over the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations and over
development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity, based on the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for
Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria], during
the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000.
These disclosures and controls are the responsibility of ABC-CA’s management. Our responsibility is to
express an opinion based on our examination.
Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and accordingly, included (1) obtaining an understanding of
ABC-CA’s key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy practices and its
controls over key and certificate integrity, over the authenticity and privacy of subscriber and relying
party information, over the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations and over
development, maintenance, and operation of systems integrity; (2) selectively testing transactions
executed in accordance with disclosed key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices; (3) testing and evaluating the operating effectiveness of the controls; and (4)
performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our
examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, during the period from Xxxx, xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000, ABC-CA, in all material
respects–
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy
practices and provided such services in accordance with its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that subscriber information was
properly authenticated (for the registration activities performed by ABC-CA) and the integrity of
keys and certificates it managed was established and protected throughout their life cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that subscriber and relying party
information was restricted to authorized individuals and protected from uses not specified in the
CA's business practices disclosure; the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management
operations was maintained; and CA systems development, maintenance and operations were
properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity
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based on the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to WebTrust for
Certification Authorities Criteria].
Because of inherent limitations in controls, errors or fraud may occur and not be detected. Furthermore,
the projection of any conclusions, based on our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1)
changes made to the system or controls, (2) changes in processing requirements, (3) changes required
because of the passage of time, or (4) degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may alter the
validity of such conclusions.
The WebTrust seal of assurance for Certification Authorities on ABC-CA’s Web site constitutes a
symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to
update this report or provide any additional assurance.
The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ABC-CA and their effect on
assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the
controls, and other factors present individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have performed
no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying party
locations.
This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ABC-CA's services beyond those
covered by the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria, nor the suitability of any of ABC-CA's
services for any customer's intended purpose

[Name of CPA firm]
Certified Public Accountants
[City, State]
[Date]
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Illustration No. 4 for Use in Canada
Attest Report Based on CICA Standards
Unqualified Opinion
Auditor’s Report
To the Management of
ABC Certification Authority, Ltd.:
We have audited the assertion by the management of ABC Certification Authority, Ltd. (ABC-CA) [hot
link to management’s assertion] that during the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000 for its
Certification Authority (CA) operations at LOCATION, ABC-CA—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices [hot link to CA Business Practices Disclosure] and provided such
services in accordance with its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber information was properly authenticated (for the registration activities
performed by ABC-CA) and
- The integrity of keys and certificates it managed was established and protected
throughout their life cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber and relying party information was restricted to authorized individuals
and protected from uses not specified in the CA's business practices disclosure;
- The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations was
maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly authorized
and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

in conformity with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to
WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria]. ABC-CA’s management is responsible for its
assertion. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management’s assertion based on our audit.
We conducted our audit in accordance with standards for assurance engagements established by the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. Those standards require that we plan and perform our audit
to obtain reasonable assurance that management’s assertion is not materially misstated. Our audit
included (1) obtaining an understanding of ABC-CA’s key and certificate life cycle management business
and information privacy practices and its controls over key and certificate integrity, over the authenticity
and privacy of subscriber and relying party information, over the continuity of key and certificate life
cycle management operations and over development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity; (2)
selectively testing transactions executed in accordance with disclosed key and certificate life cycle
management business and information privacy practices; (3) testing and evaluating the operating
effectiveness of the controls; and (4) performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the
circumstances. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, ABC-CA’s management’s assertion for the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000,
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is fairly stated, in all material respects, in accordance with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification
Authorities Criteria.
Because of inherent limitations in controls, errors or fraud may occur and not be detected. Furthermore,
the projection of any conclusions, based on our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1)
changes made to the system or controls, (2) changes in processing requirements, (3) changes required
because of the passage of time, or (4) degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may alter the
validity of such conclusions.
The WebTrust seal of assurance for Certification Authorities on ABC-CA’s Web site constitutes a
symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to
update this report or provide any additional assurance.
The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ABC-CA and their effect on
assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the
controls, and other factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have
performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying
party locations.
This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ABC-CA's services beyond those
covered by the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria, nor the suitability of any of ABC-CA's
services for any customer's intended purpose.

[Name of CA firm]
Chartered Accountants

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

[City, Province]
[Date of report]
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Illustration No. 5 for Use in Canada
Example where external RAs are used, the CA does not support key escrow,
certificate renewal, certificate suspension, the use of integrated circuit cards, or
the provision of subscriber key management services)
Attest Report Based on CICA Standards
Unqualified Opinion
Auditor’s Report
To the Management of
ABC Certification Authority, Ltd.:
We have audited the assertion by the management of ABC Certification Authority, Ltd. (ABC-CA) [hot
link to management’s assertion] that during the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000 for its
Certification Authority (CA) operations at LOCATION, ABC-CA—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices [hot link to CA Business Practices Disclosure] and provided such
services in accordance with its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber information was properly authenticated (for the registration activities
performed by ABC-CA) and
- The integrity of keys and certificates it managed was established and protected
throughout their life cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber and relying party information was restricted to authorized individuals
and protected from uses not specified in the CA's business practices disclosure;
- the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations was
maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly authorized
and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

in conformity with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to
WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria]. ABC-CA’s management is responsible for its
assertion. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management’s assertion based on our audit.
ABC-CA makes use of external registration authorities for specific subscriber registration activities as
disclosed in ABC-CA’s business practice disclosures. Our audit did not extend to the controls of external
registration authorities.
We conducted our audit in accordance with standards for assurance engagements established by the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. Those standards require that we plan and perform our audit
to obtain reasonable assurance that management’s assertion is not materially misstated. Our audit
included (1) obtaining an understanding of ABC-CA’s key and certificate life cycle management business
and information privacy practices and its controls over key and certificate integrity, over the privacy of
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subscriber and relying party information, over the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management
operations and over development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity; (2) selectively testing
transactions executed in accordance with disclosed key and certificate life cycle management business
and information privacy practices; (3) testing and evaluating the operating effectiveness of the controls;
and (4) performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe
that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, ABC-CA’s management’s assertion for the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000,
is fairly stated, in all material respects, in accordance with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification
Authorities Criteria.
Because of inherent limitations in controls, errors or fraud may occur and not be detected. Furthermore,
the projection of any conclusions, based on our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1)
changes made to the system or controls, (2) changes in processing requirements, (3) changes required
because of the passage of time, or (4) degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may alter the
validity of such conclusions.
The WebTrust seal of assurance for Certification Authorities on ABC-CA’s Web site constitutes a
symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to
update this report or provide any additional assurance.
The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ABC-CA and their effect on
assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the
controls, and other factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have
performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying
party locations.
This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ABC-CA's services beyond those
covered by the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria, nor the suitability of any of ABC-CA's
services for any customer's intended purpose.
[Name of CA firm]
Chartered Accountants

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

[City, Province]
[Date of report]
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Illustration No. 6 for Use in Canada
Direct Report Based on CICA Standards
Unqualified Opinion
Auditor’s Report
To the Management of
ABC Certification Authority, Ltd.:
We have audited, for its LOCATION, ABC Certification Authority, Ltd.’s (ABC-CA) disclosure of its
key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy practices) and the
effectiveness of its controls over key and certificate integrity, over the authenticity and privacy of
subscriber and relying party information, over the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management
operations and over development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity during the period Xxxx
xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000 . These disclosures and controls are the responsibility of the ABC-CA’s
management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the conformity of these disclosures and
controls with the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to WebTrust for
Certification Authorities Criteria], based on our audit.
We conducted our audit in accordance with standards for assurance engagements established by the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. Those standards require that we plan and perform our audit
to obtain reasonable assurance as a basis for our opinion. Our audit included (1) obtaining an
understanding of ABC-CA’s key and certificate life cycle management business and information privacy
practices and its controls over key and certificate integrity, over the authenticity and privacy of subscriber
and relying party information, over the continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations
and over development, maintenance and operation of systems integrity; (2) selectively testing transactions
executed in accordance with disclosed key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices; (3) testing and evaluating the operating effectiveness of the controls; and (4)
performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our
audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, during the period Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000, ABC-CA, in all material
respects—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices [hot link to CA Business Practices Disclosure] and provided such
services in accordance with its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber information was properly authenticated (for the registration activities
performed by ABC-CA) and
- The integrity of keys and certificates it managed was established and protected
throughout their life cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
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- Subscriber and relying party information was restricted to authorized individuals
and protected from uses not specified in the CA's business practices disclosure;
- The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations was
maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly authorized
and performed to maintain CA systems integrity
in conformity with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to
WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria].
Because of inherent limitations in controls, errors or fraud may occur and not be detected. Furthermore,
the projection of any conclusions, based on our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1)
changes made to the system or controls, (2) changes in processing requirements, (3) changes required
because of the passage of time, or (4) degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may alter the
validity of such conclusions.
The WebTrust seal of assurance for Certification Authorities on ABC-CA’s Web site constitutes a
symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended nor should it be construed to
update this report or provide any additional assurance.
The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ABC-CA and their effect on
assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the
controls, and other factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. We have
performed no procedures to evaluate the effectiveness of controls at individual subscriber and relying
party locations.
This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ABC-CA's services beyond those
covered by the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria, nor the suitability of any of ABC-CA's
services for any customer's intended purpose.
[Name of CA firm]
Chartered Accountants

WebTrust for Certification Authorities

[City, Province]
[Date of report]
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Appendix B - Illustrative Examples of Management’s Assertion

Illustration No. 1 for Use in the United States and Canada
(Example where all criteria are applicable)
Assertion of Management as to
its Disclosure of its Business Practices and its Controls Over
its Certification Authority Operations
during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000

[Date]

ABC Certification Authority, Inc. operates as a Certification Authority (CA) known as ABC-CA. ABCCA, as a Root CA [or as a subordinate CA of DEF Certification Authority, Inc.], provides the following
certification authority services:
•

Subscriber key management services

•

Subscriber registration

•

Certificate renewal

•

Certificate rekey

•

Certificate issuance

•

Certificate distribution [using an online repository]

•

Certificate revocation

•

Certificate suspension

•

Certificate status information processing [using an online repository]

•

Integrated circuit card life cycle management

Management of ABC-CA is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective controls over its CA
operations, including CA business practices disclosure [hot link to CA Business Practices Disclosure],
service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle management controls), and CA environmental
controls. These controls contain monitoring mechanisms, and actions are taken to correct deficiencies
identified.
There are inherent limitations in any controls, including the possibility of human error and the
circumvention or overriding of controls. Accordingly, even effective controls can provide only
reasonable assurance with respect to ABC-CA’s Certification Authority operations. Furthermore because
of changes in conditions, the effectiveness of controls may vary over time.
Management has assessed the controls over its CA operations. Based on that assessment, in ABC
Certification Authority, Inc. (ABC-CA) Management’s opinion, in providing its Certification Authority
(CA) services at LOCATION, ABC-CA, during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy,
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2000—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices and provided such services in accordance with its disclosed
practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber information was properly authenticated (for the registration activities
performed by ABC-CA) and
- The integrity of keys and certificates it managed was established and protected
throughout their life cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber and relying party information was restricted to authorized individuals
and protected from uses not specified in the CA's business practices disclosure;
- The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations was
maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly authorized
and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

based on the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to WebTrust for
Certification Authorities Criteria] including the following:
CA Business Practices Disclosure
Service Integrity
Key Life Cycle Management Controls
CA Key Generation
CA Key Storage, Backup, and Recovery
CA Public Key Distribution
CA Key Escrow
CA Key Usage
CA Key Destruction
CA Key Archival
CA Cryptographic Hardware Life Cycle Management
CA-Provided Subscriber Key Management Services
Certificate Life Cycle Management Controls
Subscriber Registration
Certificate Renewal
Certificate Rekey
Certificate Issuance
Certificate Distribution
Certificate Revocation
Certificate Suspension
Certificate Status Information Processing
Integrated Circuit Card Life Cycle Management
CA Environmental Controls
WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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Certification Practice Statement and Certificate Policy Management
Security Management
Asset Classification and Management
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental Security
Operations Management
System Access Management
Systems Development and Maintenance
Business Continuity Management
Monitoring and Compliance
Event Journaling

[Name]
[Title]
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Illustration No. 2 for Use in the United States and Canada
(Example where external RAs are used, the CA does not support key escrow,
certificate renewal, certificate suspension, the use of integrated circuit cards, or
the provision of subscriber key management services)
Assertion of Management as to
its Disclosure of its Business Practices and its Controls Over
its Certification Authority Operations
during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000
[Date]
ABC Certification Authority, Inc. operates as a Certification Authority (CA) known as ABC-CA. ABCCA, as a Root CA [or as a subordinate CA of DEF Certification Authority, Inc.], provides the following
certification authority services:
•

Certificate rekey

•

Certificate issuance

•

Certificate distribution (using an online repository)

•

Certificate revocation

•

Certificate status information processing (using an online repository)

ABC-CA makes use of external registration authorities for specific subscriber registration activities as
disclosed in ABC-CA’s business practice disclosures.
Management of ABC-CA is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective controls over its
Certification Authority operations, including CA business practices disclosure [hot link to CA Business
Practices Disclosure], service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle management controls),
and CA environmental controls. These controls contain monitoring mechanisms, and actions are taken to
correct deficiencies identified.
There are inherent limitations in any controls including the possibility of human error and the
circumvention or overriding of controls. Accordingly, even effective internal control can provide only
reasonable assurance with respect to ABC-CA’s Certification Authority operations. Furthermore because
of changes in conditions, the effectiveness of controls may vary over time.
Management has assessed the controls over its CA operations. Based on that assessment, in ABC
Certification Authority, Inc. (ABC-CA) Management’s opinion, in providing its Certification Authority
(CA) services at LOCATION, ABC-CA, during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy,
2000—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices and provided such services in accordance with its disclosed
practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber information was properly authenticated (for the registration activities
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performed by ABC-CA) and
- The integrity of keys and certificates it managed was established and protected
throughout their life cycles
•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber and relying party information was restricted to authorized individuals
and protected from uses not specified in the CA's business practices disclosure;
- The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations was
maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly authorized
and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

based on the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria [hot link to WebTrust for
Certification Authorities Criteria] including the following:
CA Business Practices Disclosure
Service Integrity
Key Life Cycle Management Controls
CA Key Generation
CA Key Storage, Backup and Recovery
CA Public Key Distribution
CA Key Usage
CA Key Destruction
CA Key Archival
CA Cryptographic Hardware Life Cycle Management
Certificate Life Cycle Management Controls
Subscriber Registration
Certificate Rekey
Certificate Issuance
Certificate Distribution
Certificate Revocation
Certificate Status Information Processing
CA Environmental Controls
Certification Practice Statement and Certificate Policy Management
Security Management
Asset Classification and Management
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental Security
Operations Management
System Access Management
Systems Development and Maintenance
Business Continuity Management
Monitoring and Compliance
Event Journaling
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[Name]
[Title]
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Appendix C - Illustrative Examples of Management’s Representation

ILLUSTRATION NO. 1 FOR USE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
(Example where all criteria are applicable)
[Date]
X, Y & Z [Name of CPA or Chartered Accountant firm]
[Address]
Dear Members of the Firm:
Management confirms its understanding that your examination of our assertion related to ABC
Certification Authority, Inc.’s (ABC-CA) business practices disclosure and controls over its Certification
Authority operations during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000, through Yyyy yy, 2000, was made for the
purpose of expressing an opinion as to whether our assertion is fairly presented, in all material respects,
and that your opinion is based on criteria for effective controls as stated in our assertion document. We
are responsible for our assertion. In connection with your examination, management
a.

Acknowledges its responsibility for establishing and maintaining effective controls over its
Certification Authority (CA) operations at LOCATION, including CA business practices
disclosure, service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle management controls), and
CA environmental controls.

b.

Has performed an assessment and believes that ABC-CA’s CA business practices disclosure,
service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle management controls), and CA
environmental controls met the minimum requirement of the criteria described in our assertion
document during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000, through Yyyy yy, 2000.

c.

Believes the stated criteria against which our assertion has been assessed are reasonable and
appropriate.

d.

Has disclosed to you that there are no significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the
controls which could adversely affect the Company’s ability to comply with the control criteria
related to ABC-CA’s CA business practices disclosure, service integrity (including key and
certificate life cycle management controls), and CA environmental controls, consistent with the
assertions of management.

e.

Has made available to you all significant information and records related to our assertion.

f.

Has responded fully to all inquiries made to us by you during your examination.

g.

Has disclosed to you any changes occurring or planned to occur subsequent to Yyyy yy, 2000,
in controls or other factors that might significantly affect the controls, including any corrective
actions taken by management with regard to significant deficiencies.

In management’s opinion, ABC-CA, in providing its Certification Authority (CA) services at
LOCATION, ABC-CA, during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000—
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•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices and provided such services in accordance with its disclosed
practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber information was properly authenticated (for the registration activities
performed by ABC-CA) and
- The integrity of keys and certificates it managed was established and protected
throughout their life cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber and relying party information was restricted to authorized individuals
and protected from uses not specified in the CA's business practices disclosure;
- The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations was
maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly authorized
and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

based on the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria including the following:
CA Business Practices Disclosure
Service Integrity
Key Life Cycle Management Controls
CA Key Generation
CA Key Storage, Backup and Recovery
CA Public Key Distribution
CA Key Escrow
CA Key Usage
CA Key Destruction
CA Key Archival
CA Cryptographic Hardware Life Cycle Management
CA-Provided Subscriber Key Management Services
Certificate Life Cycle Management Controls
Subscriber Registration
Certificate Renewal
Certificate Rekey
Certificate Issuance
Certificate Distribution
Certificate Revocation
Certificate Suspension
Certificate Status Information Processing
Integrated Circuit Card Life Cycle Management
CA Environmental Controls
Certification Practice Statement and Certificate Policy Management
Security Management
WebTrust for Certification Authorities
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Asset Classification and Management
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental Security
Operations Management
System Access Management
Systems Development and Maintenance
Business Continuity Management
Monitoring and Compliance
Event Journaling
Very truly yours,

[Name]
[Title]
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ILLUSTRATION NO. 2 FOR USE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
(Example where external RAs are used, the CA does not support key escrow,
certificate renewal, certificate suspension, the use of integrated circuit cards, or
the provision of subscriber key management services)
[Date]
X, Y & Z [Name of CPA or Chartered Accountant firm]
Address
Dear Members of the Firm: Management confirms its understanding that your examination of our
assertion related to ABC Certification Authority, Inc.’s (ABC-CA) business practices disclosure and
controls over its Certification Authority operations during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000, through Yyyy
yy, 2000, was made for the purpose of expressing an opinion as to whether our assertion is fairly
presented, in all material respects, and that your opinion is based on criteria for effective controls as stated
in our assertion document. ABC-CA makes use of external registration authorities for specific subscriber
registration activities, as disclosed in ABC-CA’s business practice disclosures. We are responsible for
our assertion. In connection with your examination, management
a. Acknowledges its responsibility for establishing and maintaining effective controls over its CA
operations, including CA business practices disclosure, service integrity (including key and
certificate life cycle management controls), and CA environmental controls.
b. Has performed an assessment and believes that ABC-CA’s CA business practices disclosure,
service integrity (including key and certificate life cycle management controls), and CA
environmental controls, met the minimum requirement of the criteria described in our assertion
document during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000.
c. Believes the stated criteria against which our assertion has been assessed are reasonable and
appropriate.
d. Has disclosed to you that there are no significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the
controls which could adversely affect the Company’s ability to comply with the control criteria
related to ABC-CA’s CA business practices disclosure, service integrity (including key and
certificate life cycle management controls), and CA environmental controls, consistent with the
assertions of management.
e. Has made available to you all significant information and records related to our assertion.
f.
Has responded fully to all inquiries made to us by you during your examination.
g. Has disclosed to you any changes occurring or planned to occur subsequent to Yyyy yy, 2000,
in controls or other factors that might significantly affect the controls, including any corrective
actions taken by management with regard to significant deficiencies.
In management’s opinion, ABC-CA, in providing its Certification Authority (CA) services at
LOCATION, ABC-CA, during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000 through Yyyy yy, 2000—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and information
privacy practices and provided such services in accordance with its disclosed
practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber information was properly authenticated (for the registration activities
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performed by ABC-CA) and
- The integrity of keys and certificates it managed was established and protected
throughout their life cycles
•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber and relying party information was restricted to authorized individuals
and protected from uses not specified in the CA's business practices disclosure;
- The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations was
maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly authorized
and performed to maintain CA systems integrity

based on the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria including the following:
CA Business Practices Disclosure
Service Integrity
Key Life Cycle Management Controls
CA Key Generation
CA Key Storage, Backup and Recovery
CA Public Key Distribution
CA Key Usage
CA Key Destruction
CA Key Archival
CA Cryptographic Hardware Life Cycle Management
Certificate Life Cycle Management Controls
Subscriber Registration
Certificate Rekey
Certificate Issuance
Certificate Distribution
Certificate Revocation
Certificate Status Information Processing
CA Environmental Controls
Certification Practice Statement and Certificate Policy Management
Security Management
Asset Classification and Management
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental Security
Operations Management
System Access Management
Systems Development and Maintenance
Business Continuity Management
Monitoring and Compliance
Event Journaling
Very truly yours,
[Name]
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[Title]
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Appendix D - WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria and ANSI X9.79 (draft) CrossReference

Mapping of the WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria
to the ANSI X9.79 (draft) PKI Practices and Policy Framework standard’s
Certification Authority Control Objectives (CACO)

WebTrust for Certification Authorities
Criteria

X9.79

§1

CA Business Practices
Disclosure

§7, §A, & §B

General Requirements – CP
and Certification Practice
Statements; PKI Practices and
Policy Elements; and
Certification Authority Control
Objectives

§2

Service Integrity

§B.2 & B.3

Key and Certificate Life Cycle
Management Controls

§2.1

Key Life Cycle Management
Controls

§B.2

Key Life Cycle Management
Controls

§2.1.1
§2.1.2

CA Key Generation
CA Key Storage, Backup and
Recovery
CA Public Key Distribution
CA Key Escrow
CA Key Usage
CA Key Destruction
CA Key Archival
CA Cryptographic Hardware Life
Cycle Management
CA-Provided Subscriber Key
Management Services

§B.2.1
§B.2.2

CA Key Generation
CA Key Storage, Backup and
Recovery
CA Public Key Distribution
CA Key Escrow
CA Key Usage
CA Key Destruction
CA Key Archival
CA Cryptographic Hardware Life
Cycle Management
CA-Provided Subscriber Key
Management Services

§2.2

Certificate Life Cycle
Management Controls

§B.3

Certificate Life Cycle
Management Controls

§2.2.1
§2.2.2
§2.2.3
§2.2.4
§2.2.5
§2.2.6

Subscriber Registration
Certificate Renewal
Certificate Rekey
Certificate Issuance
Certificate Distribution
Certificate Revocation

§B.3.1
§B.3.2
§B.3.3
§B.3.4
§B.3.5
§B.3.6

Subscriber Registration
Certificate Renewal
Certificate Rekey
Certificate Issuance
Certificate Distribution
Certificate Revocation

§2.1.3
§2.1.4
§2.1.5
§2.1.6
§2.1.7
§2.1.8
§2.1.9
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WebTrust for Certification Authorities
Criteria

X9.79

§2.2.7
§2.2.8

Certificate Suspension
Certificate Status Information
Processing
Integrated Circuit Card (ICC)
Life Cycle Management

§B.3.7
§B.3.8

§3

CA Environmental Controls

§B.1

CA Environmental Controls

§3.1

Certification Practice Statement
and Certificate Policy
Management
Security Management
Asset Classification and
Management
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental
Security
Operations Management
System Access Management
Systems Development and
Maintenance
Business Continuity Management
Monitoring and Compliance
Event Journaling

§B.1.1

Certification Practice Statement
and Certificate Policy
Management
Security Management
Asset Classification and
Management
Personnel Security
Physical and Environmental
Security
Operations Management
System Access Management
Systems Development and
Maintenance
Business Continuity Management
Monitoring and Compliance
Event Journaling

§2.2.9

§3.2
§3.3
§3.4
§3.5
§3.6
§3.7
§3.8
§3.9
§3.10
§3.11
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Appendix E - Comparison of CICA Section 5900, AICPA SAS 70 and AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Reports Covering the
Business Activities of Certification Authority Organizations

This document analyzes the form and content of reviews and reports performed under the indicated regulations indicating appropriate similarities and
differences. For third-party reporting with respect to certification authorities, the most appropriate and relevant approach is to use the AICPA/CICA
Certification Authority (CA) Trust approach wherever possible since it has been developed specifically around the reportable business activities of an
organization acting as a certification authority.
Content/Approach

CICA Section 5900

AICPA SAS No. 70

Purpose

-

-

Target of Evaluation

Auditor to auditor communication for
obtaining reliance for audit purposes
- Covers specified applications, functions,
and processing environments
- Practical usage now results in business
activity coverage
Defined by each engagement

Auditor to auditor communication for
obtaining reliance for audit purposes
- Covers specified applications, functions
and processing environments
- Practical usage now results in business
activity coverage
Defined by each engagement

Type of Engagement

-

-

Examination
Standards
Coverage of
Activities

Report on design and existence of
control procedures
- Report on design, effective operation,
and continuity of control procedures
Generally accepted auditing standards

Generally accepted auditing standards

No mandatory coverage

No mandatory coverage

Coverage must be formulated for each
engagement and defined in report scope.

Coverage must be formulated for each
engagement and defined in report scope.
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Report on controls placed in operation
Report on controls placed in operation
and tests of operating effectiveness
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AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification
Authorities
- Auditor communication to interested
parties including business partners,
existing/potential customers
- Mandatory coverage as noted below
- New standard for reporting activities of
certification authorities
Certification authority business activities predefined in principles and criteria
- Report on compliance with WebTrust for
Certification Authorities Principles and
Criteria
Standards for Attestation Engagements (U.S.)
Standards for Assurance Engagements (Cdn)
Areas of coverage defined by principles and
criteria, including:
- CA business practice disclosure
(including the privacy of subscriber and
relying party information)
- Service integrity
- Key life cycle management controls
- Certificate life cycle management
controls
- CA environmental controls

Version 1.0

Content/Approach

CICA Section 5900

AICPA SAS No. 70

Linkage to
Authoritative
Standards

Any linkage would need to be established as
part of a specific review.

Any linkage would need to be established as
part of a specific review.

Adequacy of control objectives and
procedures subjectively determined by auditor
based on the engagement.

Adequacy of control objectives and
procedures subjectively determined by auditor
based on engagement.

Acceptable alternatives:
- Point in time (for design and existence)
- Period of time (determined by client)

Acceptable alternatives:
- Point in time (controls placed in
operation)
- Period of time (determined by client)

Period of Coverage of
Review
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AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification
Authorities
Principles and criteria linked to ANSI X9.79
standard which is intended to be submitted to
ISO for international standardization.
AICPA/CICA provides uniform standards
which are linked to industry accepted
standards.
Continuous coverage from the point of
qualification. Qualification after compliance
can be tested over a minimum ninety-day
period. Then updates within a specified
period (currently under debate whether this
would be six months or annual or some other).
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Appendix F - Practitioner Policies and Guidance for WebTrust for Certification Authority
Engagements
Introduction
This section includes Practitioner Policies (as defined in the WebTrust Business License, Appendix A –
Defined Terms – “Policies Statement”), which set forth practices that practitioners must follow when
conducting a WebTrust engagement. These policies are in italic typeface. This section also includes
additional practitioner guidance on implementing these policies. This guidance is in normal typeface.
Client/Engagement Acceptance
The practitioner should not accept an engagement where the awarding of a WebTrust Seal would be
misleading.
The WebTrust Seal implies that the entity is a reputable site that has reasonable disclosures and controls
in a broad range of areas. Accordingly, the practitioner would avoid accepting a WebTrust engagement
where the entity’s disclosures outside the scope of the engagement are known by the practitioner to be
misleading, where there are known major problems with controls not directly affecting the scope of the
engagement or where the entity is a known violator of laws or regulations.
Procedures to provide WebTrust services resulting in the awarding of a WebTrust Seal should be
performed at a high level of assurance (i.e., audit or examination level).
Although a practitioner can provide a variety of services related to WebTrust, such as a preliminary
review of a CA to identify potential areas of non-conformity with the WebTrust for Certification
Authorities Criteria, any engagement leading to a WebTrust Seal would need to include procedures to
provide a high level of assurance (i.e., audit or examination level) as a basis for an unqualified opinion.
Initial Period of Coverage
The period of coverage for an initial WebTrust for Certification Authorities engagement should be at
least two months or more as determined by the practitioner.
In determining the initial period of coverage, the practitioner would consider what length of period would
be required to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter as a basis for his or her opinion. For
example, for established CAs and CA functions, two months may be quite sufficient, while for new CAs
and CA functions, the practitioner may believe that a longer initial period would be more appropriate.
Frequency of Updates
The interval between updates for the WebTrust for Certification Authorities seal should not exceed twelve
months and this interval often may be considerably shorter.
In determining the interval between updates, the practitioner would consider:
•

The nature and complexity of the CA’s operations

•

The frequency of significant changes to the CA’s operations

•

The relative effectiveness of the entity’s monitoring and change management controls for
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ensuring continued conformity with the applicable WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria
as such changes are made
•

The practitioner’s professional judgment.

For example, in the situation of a start-up CA or CA function, it may be more appropriate that the initial
examination period be established at three months, with the next review being performed six months after
the WebTrust seal for Certification Authorities is awarded, thereafter moving to a twelve-month review
cycle. In order to provide continuous coverage and retain the seal, the period covered for update reports
should either begin with the end of the prior period or the start of the period in the initial report.
If the entity notifies the practitioner of a significant change potentially affecting conformance with the
applicable WebTrust for Certification Authority Criteria included in the scope of the engagement during
the period between updates, the practitioner should determine whether:
a. An update examination would need to be performed,
b. The seal would need to be removed until an update examination is completed and an updated
auditor’s report is issued, or
c. No action is required at that time because of the nature of the change and/or the effectiveness of
the entity’s monitoring and change management controls.
Management Assertions
Management should provide an appropriate written assertion on its Web site. (Example management
assertions have been provided as Appendix B.)
Management’s assertion would ordinarily identify the specific certification authority covered, the period
covered (which ordinarily would be same as that covered by the practitioner’s report), and include a
statement along the following lines, for example for the Certification Authority model:
Management has assessed the controls over its CA operations. Based on that assessment, in ABC
Certification Authority, Inc. (ABC-CA) Management’s opinion, in providing its Certification
Authority (CA) services at LOCATION, ABC-CA, during the period from Xxxx xx, 2000
through Yyyy yy, 2000—
•

Disclosed its key and certificate life cycle management business and
information privacy practices and provided such services in accordance with
its disclosed practices

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber information was properly authenticated (for the registration
activities performed by ABC-CA) and
- The integrity of keys and certificates it managed was established and
protected throughout their life cycles

•

Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:
- Subscriber and relying party information was restricted to authorized
individuals and protected from uses not specified in the CA's business
practices disclosure;
- The continuity of key and certificate life cycle management operations
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was maintained; and
- CA systems development, maintenance and operations were properly
authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity
based on the AICPA/CICA WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria
Changes in Client Policies and Disclosures
Changes in an entity’s disclosed policies need to be disclosed on its Web site. If the client appropriately
discloses such changes, no mention of such change needs to be made in the practitioner’s report.
Sufficient Criteria for Unqualified Opinion
In order to obtain an unqualified opinion, the entity should meet, in all material respects, all of the
applicable WebTrust for Certification Authorities Criteria included in the scope of the engagement
during the period covered by the report and each update period.
Subsequent Events
The practitioner should consider the effect of subsequent events up to the date of the practitioner’s
report. When the practitioner becomes aware of events that materially affect the subject matter, and the
practitioner’s conclusion, the practitioner should consider whether the disclosed practices reflects those
events properly or whether those events are addressed properly in the practitioner’s report.
Representation Letter
Prior to conclusion of the engagement and before the practitioner issues a report, the client will be
required to provide to the practitioner a Representation Letter. (An example representation letter has
been provided in Appendix C.)
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